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Executive Summary 
The objective of this study is to review the extent to which the five Paris Principles 
(PPs) on Aid Effectiveness (AE) as set out in the Paris Declaration (PD) on AE: 
ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability, 
are being applied in the water and sanitation sector.  
The approach included in-depth case study research in three countries (Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia and Uganda) and a broader document review. From this evidence the study 
aims to identify ways in which external support to the water sector can be delivered 
more in the spirit of the PD. 
This study was carried out by ODI with Alan Nicol as team leader and Katharina 
Welle as the lead author of the study. The country case studies were conducted by 
Barbara Evans (Bangladesh), Josephine Tucker (Uganda) and Katharina Welle 
(Ethiopia). Susi Owusu provided background support. 
The starting point of this review was a perception among water sector stakeholders 
that the sector lags behind other basic service sectors, including health and education, 
in implementing the five principles of the PD. Four steps guided the analysis: (1) the 
international aid architecture i.e. the type of actors and levels of funding by sector was 
reviewed to identify potential implications for implementing the PD at sector level, 
(2) based on traffic-lights, a systematic comparison was carried out between countries 
and between sectors on progress towards application of the five principles of the PD; 
(3) a governance lens was used to understand the reasons behind differences of 
progress between sectors and countries; barriers to and opportunities for engagement 
were identified and; (4) some observations aimed to start putting the adherence to the 
PD in the wider context of improving development outcomes.  
 
Our findings show that the water sector is not consistently underperforming in the 
three country case studies. Rather, we suggest that the situation is one of ‘fluid 
dynamics’ – the sector is moulded by the surrounding political-economic context in 
which it is situated, i.e. predominantly by the national governance environments in the 
countries examined. The following conclusions and recommendations emerged:  
 
1. The broader governance environment is a more important influence on 
progress against the Paris Principles than sector characteristics. 
It is evident from our case studies that differences in progress against the PPs are 
more pronounced between countries than between sectors. This indicates that aspects 
of the governance context beyond the sector, rather than sector characteristics alone, 
are a key influence on progress. A key factor supporting or hindering progress is the 
political commitment to poverty reduction and to the sectors in question, the presence 
of strong financial and fiscal structures such as an MTEF, and effective institutions - 
including the relationships between different governmental and non-governmental 
bodies and at different levels.  
Include a broader governance and political-economic analysis when seeking to 
understand sector opportunities and barriers to progress against the PD: such an 
analysis could build on the existing Drivers of Change (DoC) analysis used by DFID 
in the past. This analytical framework could be developed further to look particularly 
at the sectoral politics of development change. Ethiopia, struggling with an emerging 
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programme approach in the water sector and strong inter-sectoral relations 
underpinning WSS service delivery, would lend itself well to such a study. 
 
2. The perception that the water sector is lagging behind is not supported if the 
spirit rather than the mechanics of the PD is considered 
In all three countries, moves towards a SWAp have come later in the water sector than 
in health and education. Nevertheless, progress against the PPs was further in the 
water sector in Uganda than in health and education.  In Ethiopia and Bangladesh the 
instruments associated with the PD are less well developed in water compared to the 
other two sectors. This gives the appearance of slower progress, yet our findings warn 
against such a mechanistic reading of progress and advocate for a fluid notion based 
on the spirit of the PD. The existence of instruments such as coordination mechanisms 
or sector reviews can mask shortcomings in the spirit of Paris such as a lack of trust 
and of commitment from the donor and recipient side.  
Continual review and learning rather than implementing a pre-defined set of steps are 
mechanisms to foster the spirit of the PD: The implementation of the Paris agenda in 
SWAPs or other instruments should not be seen as a one-off step but rather as an 
ongoing dynamic process. SWAPs should be a platform for learning for both donors 
and recipients, with continuous review of successes and obstacles, to help ensure that 
the intent for aid effectiveness translates into delivery. This also implies there is no 
obvious sequencing of principles but that the pace and level of engagement depends 
on the opportunities at hand in a given situation provided by the prevailing political-
economic context.   
 
3. Some dynamics are specific to particular (sub-) sectors and require a more 
targeted approach 
The type and number of actors and type and levels of financing differs between 
sectors. While all three sectors receive support from the ‘traditional’ development 
partners, the levels of private aid and of multi-lateral funding mechanisms are 
increasing rapidly. The water sector is likely to be more affected by new donors such 
as China with a particular emphasis on infrastructure development while the health 
sector stands out for receiving high levels of aid from private foundations and 
multilateral funding initiatives tied to particular development outcomes.  
Another difference between sectors is linked to the delivery systems. Water is a 
‘hybrid’ sector, with characteristics of both social and infrastructure sectors. The 
urban sub-sector requires large infrastructure investments, whilst rural and small 
urban centres require small-scale investments. For rural WSS as well as for small 
towns the development and use of government systems as well as policy alignment is 
important as it is for the health and education sectors.  
Foster a mix of financing mechanisms in the water sector and a more sophisticated 
aid effectiveness debate: In all three case study countries, systems alignment is 
considered problematic for the urban sub-sector because it is dominated by project 
modalities and off-budget funding. As urban water supply demands large, ‘lumpy’, 
multi-year investments, it is appropriate that they are funded through project-type 
mechanisms, which is the case in mature economies, as well. Donors should support 
the development of innovative mechanisms for project-type financing through 
government channels to replace parallel projects and may learn from the infrastructure 
sectors in doing so.  
 7
 
4. Some aspects of system alignment such as PFM and procurement cut across 
sectors.  
Our case studies show that sectors are all determined by wider political-economic 
structures with implications for some aspects of systems alignment. This is 
particularly so for financial management and procurement systems, which lie outside 
the sector at national level but influence the effectiveness of aid delivery at a sector 
level in all three countries.  
To address such underlying issues and barriers, engagement at a higher level than the 
sector may be more effective than trying to find solutions within a sector.  
 
5. Paucity of data for measuring progress against the PP for AE at sector level 
At sector level, data to measure progress towards the PPs for AE remains extremely 
weak. The indicators developed and used for the OECD survey on AE are not 
differentiated by sectors yet the availability of information with relevance to the PPs 
varies between sectors and countries. Furthermore, the indicators currently identified 
under the PD are at times not very informative unless further background information 
is obtained. For example, if comparing donor performance against the PD, a 
percentage of coordinated missions or coordinated analytical work does not give 
much information about how the quality of the relationship has improved and whether 
transaction costs have been reduced for the recipient partner government. There is 
also currently no evidence that the fulfilment of the PP leads to better development 
outcomes e.g. increased access to WSS.  
Develop a coherent set of sector level indicators to enable monitoring progress 
against the PP. If sector actors are serious in their intention to measure progress 
against the PP at a sector level, they need to develop a set of indicators and data 
against those to enable them to measure and compare progress between sectors and/or 
countries. Ideally this would be underpinned by a more sophisticated measuring of 
progress at country level that links progress against the PP with changes in 
development outputs and outcomes in the short, medium and long-term. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Purpose, Scope and Methodology 
The objective of this study is to review the extent to which the five Paris Principles 
(PP) on Aid Effectiveness (AE) as set out in the Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid 
Effectiveness—ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results (MfR) and 
mutual accountability—are being applied in the water and sanitation sector (WSS). 
The approach included in-depth case study research in three countries (Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia and Uganda) and a broader document review. From this evidence the study 
aims to identify ways in which external support to the water sector1 can be delivered 
more in the spirit of the Paris Declaration.  
The study covers both urban and rural investments in water and sanitation service 
provision but excludes water resources management and humanitarian responses. It 
compares the water sector with the health and education sectors in terms of progress 
towards application of the Paris Principles.  From this analysis the study draws out 
the major sectoral and contextual reasons for differences in progress between sectors 
and across countries. 
Within Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Uganda was chosen as a case study because it is a 
country with a relatively long experience in harmonisation and alignment; Ethiopia 
was selected because the water sector has recently introduced greater harmonisation 
and alignment and has received large aid inputs including from DFID; whilst 
Bangladesh is a country with a longstanding commitment to the Paris Principles and 
provides some comparison between policy environments in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa.   
The three case studies are complemented by reviews of the global sector literature on 
progress to date against application of the PP towards greater AE.  
During short field visits to each country evidence was collected in semi-structured 
interviews with key sector stakeholders. These interviews covered questions on the 
profile of each sector, progress against the PD and questions related to the sector 
performance in recent years.  
A traffic-light system enabled comparison between countries and between sectors on 
progress towards application of the five principles of the PD (see also Annex 1 for a 
table showing the data behind the classification of each sector and country).  
During field work, whilst the primary focus was on the water sector, data was 
collected for the health and education sectors as well. Where available the researchers 
collected quantitative data relating to the PPs, but because of its paucity in many 
cases this was complemented with qualitative information obtained through 
interviews.  
1.2 Rationale  
There is a perception among water sector stakeholders that the sector lags behind 
other sectors in applying the PPs. Work examining progress towards integration of 
the sector with the ‘nuts and bolts’ of government-owned comprehensive poverty 
reduction strategies such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and 
                                                 
1 Note: the authors use the term ‘water sector’ as shorthand for water and sanitation & 
hygiene. If reference is made to one or either sub-sector this is specifically indicated.   
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related instruments such as Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) has 
concluded that integration is limited.   WSP (2003: 1) cites for example 
“despite the fact that water and sanitation are consistently among the top three or 
four priorities of the poor in participatory poverty assessments in most countries 
in this region [SSA], the sector has not effectively been incorporated into PRSPs 
[…]. Sectors such as health and education are likely to have received more 
attention.”  
This notwithstanding, sectoral integration into PRSPs does not equal progress against 
application of the PPs. Few studies have focused specifically on water sector 
performance against the PD or compared progress with other sectors. A good practice 
review by DANIDA (2006)2 assessed the agency’s experience in harmonisation and 
alignment in the water sector, but did not carry out a systematic assessment of sector 
progress against the PD.  
This study provides a more systematic examination of evidence from three countries 
against the PPs and across three sectors. Whilst it points to important lessons for 
future engagement in the sector, it is however necessarily narrow in its sample, and a 
broader and longer-term study would be an important follow-up in the near future, 
perhaps following the Accra Meeting. 
1.3 Towards more effective aid 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 were a statement of 
international commitment to reduce poverty. At the same time the international aid 
community focused on the need for greater aid effectiveness in order to meet this 
commitment – an approach best captured under MDG 8: “Develop a global 
partnership for development”. Under the new aid agenda, the ultimate goal is that 
governments take the lead in formulating nationally-owned poverty reduction 
strategies and sector-level development programmes, with the participation of a wide 
range of stakeholders. Aid agencies then work under and to these strategies and 
provide ‘programme-based aid’ (PBA) – see Box 1 below.  
The idea is that PBA should be channelled through government systems, and thus 
further strengthen nationally-led development processes. The AE agenda is intended 
to move countries and donors towards this goal, though the shift to PBA and 
alignment is not necessarily expected to happen immediately.  
Box 1: Programme-based Approaches 
Programme-based approaches are a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the 
principles of coordinated support for a locally-owned programme of development, such as a national 
development strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a specific 
organisation. Programme-based approaches share the following features: 
Leadership by the host country or organisation; 
A single comprehensive programme and budget framework; 
A formalised process for donor coordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for reporting, 
budgeting, financial management and procurement; and 
Efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and implementation, financial 
management, monitoring and evaluation. 
Source: OECD-DAC, 2006 
                                                 
2 The main lessons have been summarised in an ODI project briefing (Welle, Nicol and 
Steenbergen, 2008); additional lessons were highlighted in a WELL Briefing Note (2007).  
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This process culminated in the PD on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 (HLF, 2005) which 
embodied an international consensus on the management of development assistance. 
Signed by 114 countries and 25 international organisations3, the PD provides five 
operating principles for governments and donors to follow in order to improve aid 
effectiveness: namely ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and 
mutual accountability. 
Implicit within the PD is a pyramid of principles (see Fig. 1 below), which represents 
a partnership between donors and the recipient country. From partner country 
ownership at the apex, in theory all other principles cascade down.  
Figure 1: Partnership for achieving the Paris Principles 
 
Source: OECD, 2007 
Ownership is seen as the foundation for aid effectiveness. It is expressed in the 
recipient country setting the major policy directions and strategies for poverty 
reduction and pro-poor growth (i.e. PRSPs, Medium Term Expenditure Framework – 
MTEF - and sector development programmes that are reflected in the PRSP and 
MTEF). Donors respond by aligning their support with the priorities and systems set 
out in national policies and strategies. At the same time, donors build capacity and 
harmonise by establishing common arrangements (for example for funding or 
reporting) to reduce transaction costs for the recipient country. Managing for results 
(MfR) and mutual accountability cut across all those involved and all levels. MfR 
refers to governments adopting frameworks to monitor development results and using 
information for better decision making. Mutual accountability stands for aid 
relationships that are underpinned by a commitment to development results from both 
sides jointly agreed upon and measured through partnership commitments.  
The goal is to take steps to move up the pyramid while continuing efforts to build 
ownership (OECD–WB, 2005). In cases where ownership is weak, donors may seek 
to foster greater national ownership through their interactions with partner 
governments. In parallel, donors take steps towards harmonisation which can be 
initiated under any circumstances. Harmonisation should in theory reduce transaction 
costs for partner governments, although in the short term transaction costs may be 
increased by changes in donor arrangements. 
In the PD, donors and partner countries commit themselves to specific actions under 
each principle, some of which are translated into 12 indicators to measure progress at 
                                                 
3 See also: www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclaration/members  
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country level.4 These actions and the associated indicators are summarised in Table 1 
below, which is derived from the PD.  
Table 1: Commitments and indicators organised by the five PPs  
Ownership 
Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate 
development actions 
Partner countries exercise leadership through 
implementing (results-oriented) development 
strategies linked to MTEF and reflected in annual 
budgets (Indicator 1) 
Donors respect country leadership and help strengthen 
capacity to exercise it 
Alignment 
Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and 
procedures 
Partner countries strengthen capacity to manage, 
implement and account for results of policies and 
programmes (analysis, dialogue, implementation, 
monitoring)  
Partner countries strengthen Public Financial 
Management (PFM) capacity and national 
procurement systems (Indicator 2) 
Donors base their overall support - country strategies, 
dialogues, programmes, development cooperation 
programmes and reviews of progress (including 
conditions) - on the country’s development strategies 
and link funding to indicators derived from a single 
strategy; (Indicator 3 measures aid that is reported on-
budget) 
Donors implement technical cooperation through 
coordinated programmes consistent with national 
development strategies (Indicator 4) 
Donors use the country’s own institutions and systems 
(PFM, auditing, accounting, procurement, monitoring) to 
the maximum extent and avoid arrangements that 
undermine country systems & procedures (Indicator 5 – 
measures PFM and procurement) 
Donors reduce the stock of Parallel Implementation 
Units (PIUs) (Indicator 6) 
Donors provide commitments of aid over multi-year 
framework, timely and in predictable fashion (Indicator 7 
– measures aid not disbursed within the fiscal year for 
which it was scheduled) 
Donors untie aid (Indicator 8) 
Harmonisation 
Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective 
Partner countries provide clear views on donor 
comparative advantage to achieve donor 
complementarity at country or sector level 
Donors implement common arrangements and simplify 
procedures through the reduction of separate 
procedures and missions (Indicator 9 – measures aid 
flows provided as part of programme-based approaches) 
Donors conduct joint field missions and joint analytical 
work (Indicator 10) 
Managing for Results 
Managing resources and improving decision-making for results 
Partner countries strengthen linkages between 
national development strategies and (multi-) 
annual budget processes and establish results-
oriented reporting against national and sector 
development strategies (Indicator 11) 
Donors harmonise their monitoring and reporting 
systems and work towards aligning them with partner 
country performance assessment frameworks  
Mutual Accountability 
Donors and partners are accountable for development results 
Partner countries strengthen the parliamentary 
role in development of strategies and/or budgets 
and reinforce participatory approaches (involving a 
broad range of development partners) 
Donors provide timely, transparent, and comprehensive 
information on aid flows 
(Indicator 12 measures countries with mutual 
assessment reviews in place) 
Source: derived from HLF, 2005 
The terms of reference for this study focus on progress against the five PPs. 
However, it is important to recall that the PD is a tool to contribute towards the 
                                                 
4 Progress against the indicators is monitored through country surveys, a process facilitated 
by the OECD. In the 2006 survey 34 countries took part including Bangladesh, Ethiopia 
and Uganda. The following survey was ongoing in spring 2008; see also 
www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring for more and updated information. 
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wider goals of poverty reduction and pro-poor growth and is not an end in itself. 
While there is broad international consensus that more effective aid will lead to 
more effective aid outcomes, there is also a danger that aid effectiveness is reduced 
simply to mechanical progress against the 12 indicators in the above table, 
regardless of actual outcomes. This is particularly critical when considering the PPs 
against the MDGs and the pressure governments—and agencies—are under to 
provide results in terms of service delivery outcomes.  
Hence the need to monitor outcomes very carefully in parallel with applying the 
PPs and then to establish systems that are sufficiently reflexive to adapt to both 
positive or negative outcomes—e.g. is the PP agenda is being pushed too hard by 
donors against government institutions that are still largely embedded in projectised 
aid.  This could result in less positive than expected outcomes, indeed even in a 
reversal of WSS supply coverage, if staff time and resources are over-committed to 
re-engineering the sector at the expense of actually doing implementation. Regular, 
review feedback and reflection under the PD agenda and the avoidance of dogma is 
therefore critical and should be institutionalised as part of the process. 
 
In analysing progress against the five PPs at sector level, other issues are important 
to highlight.  
There are current debates on the suitability of the PPs to some sectors rather than 
others. Sectors have different institutional profiles, financing requirements (for 
example the proportions of recurrent and capital costs), and balances of public and 
private roles. Cabral (2008) argues that certain features of the agriculture sector, for 
example, make the application of the PPs highly challenging. Agriculture is private 
sector-led, and the role of the state in providing regulation and public goods (such 
as research) remains poorly defined in practical terms, which makes policy 
alignment more difficult. Like the water sector, agriculture can be characterised as 
both a productive sector and a human development sector and, as in water and 
health, the agriculture sector is typically governed by a wide range of ministries and 
government institutions. A study by WHO (2007) similarly highlights certain 
challenging aspects of the health sector: health provision typically includes a wide 
variety of actors working under a diverse set of sub-sector plans, and the 
importance of ensuring the quality of medicines and equipment generates more 
caution about alignment to government procurement systems than in many other 
sectors. These arguments do not question the spirit of the PD – which is important 
and applicable in all sectors – but highlight that sectors may require different 
approaches and steps to achieve the overall goal of aid effectiveness.   
The following section provides an analytical framework that incorporates the above 
discussion and helps in charting our analysis of the country case studies.  
1.4  Analytical Framework  
We take a basic governance approach to analysing the opportunities and barriers to 
progress in the three sectors.   
Governance analysis is recognised as central to the achievement of development 
outcomes (for example in DFID’s 2006 White Paper). Many barriers and 
opportunities to performance against the PPs are governance-related. More 
specifically, different studies have emphasised the importance of understanding 
politics, power and incentive structures facing both aid recipients and donors in 
order to assess what barriers there are to progress and how to overcome them (see 
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How does global aid 
architecture influence 
progress against PP? 
 
- Sector global actors 
and levels and type of 
funding  
- donor performance 
How far has progress 
been made towards the 
Paris Principles? 
 
- Ownership 
- Alignment 
- Harmonisation 
- Managing for Results 
- Mutual Accountability
What are the factors 
accounting for 
differences?  
 
- Structures 
- Actors 
- Institutions 
What are the main 
Recommendations 
for improved AE in 
the sector?  
What are the barriers, 
opportunities and 
incentives for progress 
against the PP? How can progress 
against the PP be linked 
to sector development 
outcomes? 
for example Hyden, 2008, ODI 2006, De Renzio et al 2005, Ostrom et al 2002). 
These barriers (and opportunities) may lie at the sector level or in the broader 
governance context in which the sector is embedded. Wider political-economic 
relationships influence aid relationships at a sector level, and impact on sectoral 
application of the PPs because of the vested interests in status quo relationships, the 
impact on existing actor-network relations and, ultimately, who are likely to be the 
winners and losers and new arrangements. There is a risk of unanticipated outcomes 
that are detrimental to sector performance. Plummer and Slaymaker (2007), and 
many others, have made a strong case for better governance analysis in the water 
sector, in order to understand how political factors may hinder change and how 
change itself may have political consequences.  
Our analysis draws on some elements of the Drivers of Change (DoC) approach, a 
framework for understanding and unpacking the importance of governance at 
national level, and for identifying bottlenecks and opportunities for reform. DoC 
analyses (i) structures (natural and human resources, economic and social 
structures), (ii) institutions (i.e. particularly change to the ‘rules of the game’ 
(North, 1991) and (iii) agents of change (individuals, organisations, or networks 
pursuing particular interests). The DoC approach, which is grounded in much of the 
contemporary political science and political economy literature, has been used by 
donors e.g. DFID, SIDA and the WB to support more effective provision of aid e.g. 
through better informed engagement with policy and institutional reform processes 
(DFID 2004, 2005, OECD DAC, 2005).  
 
Our analysis uses a three-step approach as summarised in Figure 2. The flow of the 
analysis is mirrored in the structure of the report.  
Figure 2: Analytical flow: Is the water sector achieving greater AE? 
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In Section 2, we first set out the global aid architecture and identify potential 
implications for the sectors’ performance against the PD. This includes the type of 
actors involved, their levels and type of funding and the performance of donors 
against the PD at a global level.  
In section 3 we then compare progress against the PPs by sector and country, using 
‘traffic lights’ to show levels of progress against each principle by sector and 
country (described for each of Uganda, Ethiopia and Bangladesh).  
In section 4 we assess reasons for differential progress between sectors and 
countries within the wider context of governance as set out in the analytical 
framework above. In so doing, we identify barriers, opportunities and incentives for 
progress against the PP.  
Section 5 shortly examines development outcomes and whether any relationship 
can be established from existing evidence between PP implementation and 
development outcomes.  
Section 6 sets out the conclusions and recommendations for water sector 
stakeholders and for the High Level Forum (HLF) on AE in Accra in 2008. 
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2  Sector aid architecture and the Paris Agenda  
This section sets out the aid architecture of the education, health and water sectors 
and implications for sector performance against the PPs. First we examine the main 
actors and differences in type and area of funding at a global level then we turn to 
donor performance by sector. Finally, using OECD/DAC data we study overall 
application of the PPs in order to identify possible patterns by sector.  
2.1 Global actors and type of funding  
Globally development assistance is changing with implications for education, health 
and water. Changes include large new bilateral agencies from the South e.g. China 
and India an increase in private non-for-profit organisations5 and the emergence of 
new funding mechanisms including vertical funds (Kharas, 2007). The emergence of 
new bilateral agencies led by China’s contribution of USD 2 billion to Official 
Development Aid (ODA) in 2005 is particularly important for the water sector 
because of China’s strong history of infrastructure investment. Growing vertical 
funding mechanisms are most evident in the health sector (see also Box 2 on Global 
Funds). These funds represented 7% of total multilateral aid or USD 1.8 billion in 
2005 (ibid). Taken together, the major global funds projected total pledges of between 
USD 3.7 billion to over USD 5 billion for 2006, 2007 and 2008 (see Table 2 below). 
Proportionate funding from these mechanisms is likely to have risen substantially 
since.  
Table 2: Projected funding of major global funds by sector 
Sector Fund / Year 2006 2007 2008 
Health GFATM     1,929,812,934    2,745,077,809           3,212,132,470 
 GAVI 750,000,000 750,000,000 610,000,000 
 PEPFAR 2,380,809,000  no data   no data 
Sub total  5,060,621,934    3,495,077,809           3,822,132,470 
Education FTI - Catalytic Fund1 185714285.7 185714285.7 185714285.7 
 FTI - EPDF2 18,000,000 18,000,000 18,000,000 
Sub total  203,714,286 203,714,286 203,714,286 
 
Water GFS   ~5,000,000 
 
Total   5,264,336,220 3,698,792,095 4,030,846,756 
     
Sources: GFATM Pledges, last updated April 08; www.gavialliance.org/performance ,  GAVI financial report 2005; 
 http://www.pepfar.gov/about/77643.htm ; www.education-fast-track.org    
1EFI catalytic fund commitments are yearly estimates broken down from a total of 1,3 billion between 2003 - 2009 
2EFI EPDF  commitments are yearly estimates broken down from a total of 91 million between 2005 - 2009  
The contribution of private aid is relevant for all three sectors. Overall, total private 
aid reached with USD 58-68 billion, or nearly half of total combined official aid 
(USD 112.1 billion) disbursed by traditional DAC donors and new bilateral agencies 
in 2005 (ibid).  
Information on the sector distribution of private aid is hard to come by. ODA aid 
flows in health, education and water are characterised by OECD DAC (2006) as part 
of social sector ODA.  Taken together these three sectors account for 18.2% of all 
                                                 
5 This includes foundations, private philanthropists, religious organisations and other NGOs and 
nonprofits. 
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ODA from DAC countries. Education accounts for some 21.9% of social sector ODA 
(9.6% of total ODA), water supply and sanitation 16.8% (6.9%) and health 13.0% 
(5.7%). Below, we give an overview of actors and types of funding by sector.  
In 2004 the top 10 donors for all three sectors are shown in Table 3.  This suggests 
that donor support to water supply and sanitation may be slightly more concentrated 
amongst a smaller number of more ‘traditional’ donors than education and health, in 
particular; in the latter a larger percentage of funding comes from smaller donors 
outside the top 10. These differences are likely to have increased since 2004.  
Table 3: Top 10 ODA donors by sector in 2004 
 Water supply and 
Sanitation 
Education Health 
Top 10 
ODA 
donors in 
descending 
order by 
support 
sectors 
IDA (21.8%) 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
EC 
Denmark 
Af Dev Fund 
France 
Netherlands 
Asian Dev Fund 
Others (8.2%) 
IDA (16.8%) 
France 
Japan 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
United States 
EC 
Netherlands 
Asian Dev. Fund 
Canada 
Others (15.3%) 
United States (30.6%) 
IDA 
GFATM 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
EC 
France 
Netherlands 
Canada 
Germany 
Others (17.6%) 
Source: OECD, 2006 
Interestingly, the top 10 donors are fairly consistent across the three sectors. The 
water sector shows a slightly higher contribution from development banks with the 
IDA responsible for 21.8% of total ODA and the African and Asian Development 
Funds both among the top 10 donors. The health sector stands out for receiving the 
largest proportion of funding from a single source, the US, and for having GFATM, a 
global fund, among the top 10 donors.  
2.1.1 The Health Sector 
The health sector is characterised by a large number of donors and several global 
vertical funding mechanisms. In addition, the sector attracts more support from 
private foundations such as the Gates Foundation than WSS and education.  
Box 2: Global Health Partnerships 
 
Source: Magnussen et al, 2004; WHO, 2007 
Global Health Partnerships (GHP) that emerged over the last decade have contributed significantly to 
the complexity of the sector’s global aid architecture.  Depending on definition, there are between 75 
and 100 GHPs. A heterogeneous group, GHPs range from advocacy over coordination to financing; 
the majority aim to tackle communicable diseases i.e. HIV/Aids, tuberculosis and malaria. While there 
are many GHPs in total, only few of them are global funds with a major contribution to health 
financing.   
Interestingly, vertical funds to address specific disease groups have characterised the health sector 
since the 1960s.  Despite the commitments made in 1978 at the Alma Ata conference to prioritise 
Primary Health Care, vertical funds have persisted. The most significant global funds in health are the 
Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the US President’s Emergency 
Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI).  
According to a recent review by the WHO, GHPs have had a positive impact on the sector in that they 
managed to mobilise important new resources for the sector. However, they are difficult for countries 
to manage and have increased the vertical nature of health financing. A study by McKinsey and 
Company in 20 countries (2005 in WHO, 2007) found in particular that  
 
• GHPs pay insufficient attention to health systems 
• Technical assistance in support of implementation ought to be increased 
• Communication between GHPs and recipients is often poor and  
• GHPs impose significant transaction costs for governments.  
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At the global level, aid in the health sector is fairly weakly aligned with government 
programmes: only 20% of funding to the sector overall in the form of general budget 
support, and 50% of ODA is off budget (OECD, 2008). The potential distortions 
which can result from weak alignment are demonstrated by the fact that, globally, 
between 2000-2004 funding for HIV/AIDS more than doubled while funding for 
primary health care fell by almost half (WHO, 2007). The OECD has recently 
suggested that the high level of fragmentation, short funding cycles and the 
emergence of ‘young’ donors in the health sector (in particular international 
foundations) has encouraged greater attention amongst donors to addressing the PPs 
(OECD, 2008). 
A partial response related to this increased awareness can be seen in the establishment 
of funding arrangements that seek to secure a more reliable flow of funds to the 
sector. These include the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) and 
UNITAID – both established to improve financing for drug purchases in 2006. 
Further efforts to coordinate action at an international level include the establishment 
of the International Health Partnership in 2007 and the Harmonisation for Health in 
Africa Initiative (HHAI). 
2.1.2 The Education Sector 
Only six donors account for 75% of aid flows to the basic education sub-sector 
(Mundy, 2007). Overall aid flows to education are on the rise and the majority of the 
DAC countries have increased the proportion of ODA to basic education (UNESCO, 
2005). Internationally, basic education now accounts for almost one third of all ODA 
for education, up from 5% in the early 1990s (Mundy, 2007). Compared to health, the 
education sector has only one vertical fund; the Education for All (EFA) Fast Track 
Initiative (FTI) (see Box 3).  
Box 3: Education for All 
 
Source: http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/ed_for_all/; Buse, 2007  
According to Mundy (ibid) there is also a growing trans-national advocacy network 
on EFA. The most important of these is the Global Campaign for Education (GCE) 
which includes INGOs such as Oxfam, Care and ActionAid and has been 
instrumental as a policy watchdog and campaigner for financial commitments to 
EFA. The GCE or its members are represented on HLFs and EFA fora and have 
contributed to these by introducing “a new dynamism to international political 
alignments” (ibid). 
The EFA movement took off at the World Conference on EFA in 1990. Since then, governments, non-
governmental organisations, civil society, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and the media have 
taken up the cause of providing basic education for all. At the World Education Forum 2000 the Dakar 
Framework for Action Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments was rolled out. This 
document commits governments to achieving quality basic education for all by 2015. UNESCO is the lead 
agency for the EFA initiative and has been mandated to coordinate international efforts.  
  
The Fast Track Initiative was established in 2002 as a global education partnership with the aim to 
accelerate progress towards quality universal primary education. The FTI incorporates the commitments 
made towards Aid Effectiveness and is one of few global programmes in this regard.  The WB manages 
two trust funds on behalf of the FTI: the education program development fund which provides small grants 
for countries to improve capacity for sector analysis and training and the Catalytic Fund, which provides 
short term grants to FTI-endorsed countries (28 in November 2006) to implement their plans. According to 
Buse (2007) a mixture of empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that the FTI has positively contributed 
to AE in the sector; yet this has not happened evenly and across all sub-sectors.   
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2.1.3 The Water Sector 
The water sector is characterised by a small pool of donors and only light 
coordination of UN agencies active in the sector through UN Water;  UNICEF is 
widely acknowledged to be the lead UN technical agency. The sector also has fewer 
global funding mechanisms than health. The Global Sanitation Fund (GSF, see Box 
4), launched in 2008, is the first such vertical fund in the sector.  
Box 4: The Global Sanitation Fund 
The GSF is both smaller and younger than the global funds for health and education discussed above.  The 
GSF was launched in the spring of 2008 and is administered by the Water Supply and Sanitation 
Collaborative Council, a multi-stakeholder institution hosted by the WHO.  The WSSCC has for the past few 
years supported the formation of multi-stakeholder groups (known as WASH coalitions) in 36 countries. The 
WASH coalitions perform a range of functions in different contexts, from simple information exchange (for 
example in Nepal), through advocacy on specific sanitation-related issues (Ethiopia) to sector coordination 
and alignment (in the latter case where governments are active participants, for example in Madagascar).   
 
The design of the GSF has been informed by learning from the experiences of other global funds including 
GFATM and GAVI.  In contrast to vertical funds that are administered centrally GSF will establish discrete 
national programmes in each of its countries of operation.  In each case a specific scope of work for the fund 
will be developed by the WASH coalition (including government) based on local needs and priorities.  The 
documentation of the GSF specifically notes that this should take into account inter alia: the national 
sanitation policy or strategy; existing funding sources and shortfalls and approximate annual funding that can 
be well-spent without undermining other programmes in the sector.  In each country the services of an 
executing agency will be procured by WSSCC along with an independent country program monitor.  The 
WASH coalition will retain an oversight and coordination role. The budget for each country will be in the order 
of US$5-6 million over five years.  GSF will finance projects and programs that use participatory approaches 
and which contribute directly to increased access to basic sanitation for poor people.  The fund expects to 
begin disbursements in late 2008 to an initial group of seven priority countries.  Further tranches of funding 
depend on donor contributions to the fund.  
Source:  WSSCC 2008a; 2008b 
Global figures on aid effectiveness at a sector level are not available for the water 
sector. Although the sector is less complex than health, a number of global 
partnerships exist to improve coordination and provide policy advice to the sector. A 
core group of donors led largely by European bilateral agencies has provided support 
over many years to several policy-level programmes including the Water and 
Sanitation Program (WSP)6, the Water Supply & Sanitation Collaborative Council, 
and the Global Water Partnership (though working more at the level of water 
resources management). 
In addition there have been a number of attempts to include water in established 
policy support and financing arrangements which aim to attract more public and 
private capital finance for infrastructure as a whole including for example the Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility of the World Bank (PPIAF) and the Global 
Partnership for Output-based Aid. 
2.2 Donor Performance in the Three Sectors 
The 2006 baseline survey on monitoring progress against the PPs (OECD, 2007) 
reviewed not only country performance but also donor performance towards 
implementation of the PPs providing an aggregate assessment against each of the 
indicators across the entire donor portfolio. Table 4 tabulates the main donors for 
each sector against their overall performance against the relevant Paris indicators. The 
results of this assessment are presented below. We have highlighted the top three 
                                                 
6 The Water and Sanitation Program is a multi-donor partnership of the World Bank with the aim to 
help the poor gain access to improved water supply and sanitation services. WSP works directly with 
client governments in 27 countries, through four regional offices and in The WB headquarters in 
Washington. 
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performers (in green) and bottom three performers (in amber) against each indicator 
and organised donors in a descending order from high to low performance. 
Table 4: Baseline Assessment of PPs by Donor  
Baseline performance against Paris Principles (by Indicator)* Donor Sector 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10a 10b 
United Kingdom EH 84 61 76 41/23 90 100 59 44 69 
Netherlands WEH 70 36 78 23/24 65 91 68 46 77 
Denmark W 47 48 45 69/18 49 85 60 33 80 
IDA WEH 94 57 40 223/32 68 - 57 21 49 
African Dev Fund W 95 38 43 132/17 56 - 40 19 55 
Asian dev. Fund WE 88 37 45 39/6 91 - 23 5 49 
Canada EH 75 39 45 68/22 73 80 51 17 38 
GFATM H 26 - 44 4/27 20 - 82 17 33 
Japan WEH 68 74 26 2/30 66 89 33 2 52 
EC WEH 81 35 41 204/34 65 - 50 33 45 
Germany WEH 55 37 34 40/32 75 94 20 28 50 
France WH 52 20 60 63/26 45 90 28 10 41 
United States WEH 90 47 12 208/29 45 7 28 28 39 
*Indicators  
3  % of govt budget estimates of aid expenditures actually disbursed 
4  % technical assistance co-ordinated with country programmes 
5   % of ODA using procurement systems (note indicator 5 also addresses PFM systems) 
6  PIUs that are parallel to country structures (number of countries also shown) 
7  % of planned aid disbursements actually disbursed by donors  
8  % of aid which is untied 
9  % of aid which is programme-based  
10a % of donor missions which are coordinated 
10b  % of country analysis which is coordinated with other donors 
The baseline assessment of the PP by donor reveals some interesting issues about 
donors engaged in education, health and water. It shows that few donors work 
exclusively in water or in education and health. Furthermore, most donors perform 
better against some indicators than others. This suggests no simple categorisation of 
‘Paris-friendly’ or ‘Paris-unfriendly’ donors. This notwithstanding, a few donors—
e.g. DFID (with a focus mainly on education and health)—score consistently highly 
against the indicators, while others (e.g. USAID), have consistently low scores. In the 
case of the US, which has the highest share (30.6%) of total ODA, this may well have 
implications in countries where the US is a significant donor in these sectors.   
2.3 Implications for Paris 
This review of global aid architecture has a number of potential implications for 
sector performance against both the indicators and the spirit of the PD. Overall, the 
significant contribution by ‘new’ donors and private funding sources highlights the 
importance of involving the non-traditional development partners in any dialogue of 
improving effectiveness of aid.  The health sector stands out for its complexity which 
is indicated by the high number of GHPs and high funding volume passing through 
vertical programmes. Overall a smaller number of development partners are engaged 
in the education and water sectors and there are much smaller volumes of vertical 
funding.  
With regard to traditional sources of ODA, the three sectors receive funding mostly 
from the same 10 donors. Patterns of ODA funding at global level may not however 
be directly reflected at country level. In general, while donor performance against 
Paris indicators is inconsistent, the US may be generally poor and DFID relatively 
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good.  The relative contributions of these two donors to funding at country level may 
account for some specific outcomes in some sectors in some countries.     
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3 Comparison of progress against Paris Principles 
In this section, we draw on the findings from the three country case studies to 
compare sector and country progress against the PP. This progress is summarised in 
Table 5 below and then described in detail for each country in turn.  
The PD forms the basis for comparison and progress was based on our assessment of 
the achievement of commitments to date under each principle. We have used the Paris 
Indicators, where data was obtainable and qualitative information from semi-
structured interviews, to verify progress against the five PP (see also Table 1 above 
for the benchmarks used).7 The level of progress applies first and foremost within the 
country context but reflects overall progress between countries, as well.  
3.1 Three-by-three comparison  
Table 4 uses ‘traffic lights’ to illustrate patterns of progress across sectors and 
countries. Progress ranges from strong (dark green), moderate to strong (light green) 
moderate (yellow), weak to moderate (orange) and weak (red). A table summarising 
the quantitative and qualitative information used to justify the level of progress by 
principle and sector can be found in Annex 1. 
Table 5: Progress against PPs by sector and country  
 Water Health Education 
Ownership Ownership Ownership  
Alignment Alignment Alignment  
Harmonisation Harmonisation Harmonisation 
Managing for Results Managing for Results Managing for Results 
Bangladesh  
Mutual Accountability  Mutual Accountability Mutual Accountability 
Ownership Ownership Ownership 
Alignment Alignment Alignment 
Harmonisation Harmonisation Harmonisation 
Managing for Results Managing for Results Managing for Results 
Ethiopia 
Mutual Accountability  Mutual Accountability Mutual Accountability 
Ownership  Ownership Ownership 
Alignment  Alignment Alignment 
Harmonisation Harmonisation Harmonisation 
Managing for Results Managing for Results Managing for Results 
Uganda 
Mutual Accountability Mutual Accountability Mutual Accountability 
Code:  
 Strong 
 Moderate to strong 
 Moderate 
 Weak to moderate 
 Weak 
 
                                                 
7 As the framework was designed for assessing progress at country rather than the sector level, 
quantitative data was often not readily available at sector level.  
 22
The pattern in the matrix above indicates that country context is more significant than 
sector factors in achieving progress against the PPs:  
Bangladesh shows overall weak to moderate performance against the PP in each of 
the sectors studied. Ethiopia lies in the middle with a mixture of weak to 
moderate/strong progress in the water sector and moderate to strong progress in health 
and education. Overall, achievement is highest in Uganda, which is generally 
recognised as a role model among SSA countries in owning and driving forward 
poverty reduction strategies.  The results are broadly in line with the country chapters 
of the OECD global monitoring survey 2006 where Bangladesh8 and Ethiopia made 
moderate progress against all five PPs and Uganda showed high progress except for 
harmonisation where improvement was moderate.9   
The higher significance of country factors compared to sectoral factors is 
accompanied by inconsistent sector progress in the three countries. While in Uganda 
the water sector is most advanced, this position is taken by health in Bangladesh and 
by education for Ethiopia. However, the performance of a ‘sector’ may also disguise 
variable progress in different ‘sub-sectors’. Similarly, the country chapters of the 
OECD global monitoring survey do not show coherent good or bad performance by 
individual donors active in all sectors across the three countries.  
Below, we give a more detailed overview of progress against the PPs by country.  
3.2  Uganda 
In Uganda there are a number of similarities between the water, health and education 
sectors. These can be attributed to sector reforms in the late 1990s and strong political 
ownership, including leadership by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development early this decade. All three sectors have had a SWAp in place for 
several years, which involve:  
• the development and subsequent updating of sector policies and strategies linked 
to the MTEF;  
• an annual or bi-annual sector review process that includes a range of stakeholders;  
• systematic monitoring of progress against sector performance measures and 
annual reporting;  
• a working group or sector coordination committee comprising central and local 
governments, donors and NGO representation, which acts as an information-
sharing forum and exercises strong decision-making power in the sector; and 
• a development partners’ group in which most donors in the sector take part.  
Under SWAps, each sector initially saw a significant shift towards delivery of aid as 
budget support and away from projectised approaches. As a result coordination 
between government and donors improved dramatically. At the same time, HIPC debt 
relief also provided an opportunity for donors to move away from project financing. 
Moderate or strong progress against the PPs is therefore reported virtually across the 
board. However, differences are seen between the sectors with a picture emerging of 
the water sector SWAP working best out of the three sectors. 
                                                 
8 Martinez (2008) for the health sector, Riddell (2007) for the education sector and Evans 
(forthcoming) for the urban water sector paint a less positive picture of sector progress against the Paris 
Agenda.  
9 See www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring for more details and for results of individual country 
chapters.  
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All three SWAPs developed in the context of strong ownership of development plans 
and a high political priority attached to poverty reduction at national level. The 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan was developed through a highly participatory 
process, and in 2001 the Government of Uganda and key donors signed up to a set of 
Partnership Principles for effective aid (Uganda Development Partners, 2006).  
The OECD 2006 baseline study gave Uganda a score of high progress for ownership, 
alignment and managing for results, but moderate progress in harmonisation and 
mutual accountability. The study notes in particular that the high level of ownership 
“should provide a sound foundation” for aid effectiveness (OECD, 2006).  
Ownership: Although political ownership was strong in the late 1990s and early 
2000s for all three sectors, this has since declined in health (Örtendahl, 2007) and to 
some extent to education. However, political interest in education remains strong as 
demonstrated by the current presidential drive for universal secondary education. 
Ownership is considered highest in the water sector. The Ministry of Water and 
Environment has sustained strong leadership in developing and updating the SWAp, 
and sector policies and investment plans. Moreover, ownership is shared with civil 
society to a greater extent than in other sectors through engagement in the SWAp by 
UWASNET (the national network of sector NGOs).  
Alignment: In water, policy alignment is strong. Most donors in the sector take part in 
a donor working group—which is represented on the sector working group—and 
align their aid with the sector strategic plan. Systems alignment is strong for the rural 
sub-sector where 87% of aid flows are channelled as sector budget support 
(Christiansen et al, 2007).This sector budget support contributes to a government 
conditional grant that funds local government service delivery. The urban sub-sector 
remains highly projectised, with use of parallel financial systems under a pooled fund 
and a number of independent donor projects. However, with the exception of major 
funding to the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (a parastatal supplying large 
towns) most projects are on-budget. The new Joint Water and Sanitation Sector 
Programme Support (JWSSPS) brings support to the sector under a single programme 
and aims to step up alignment in the urban sub-sector over time, but so far it does not 
represent any change in delivery mechanisms (MoWE et al, 2007). This is because of 
reluctance on the part of both donors and government to channel the pooled fund 
through government’s relatively new financial systems before they are fully proven.   
In health, despite considerable progress towards alignment in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, vertical programmes have increasingly distorted sector planning and budgeting 
and aid is now dominated by projects. The Division of Labour Exercise undertaken in 
2006 revealed that there are at least 119 different projects and programmes in the 
sector. Only 25% of sector funding (but over 80% of government sector spending) is 
channelled to the recurrent costs of the minimum healthcare package, the centrepiece 
of the health policy and strategic plan. Over 50% of the health sector budget comes 
from project funding, yet only 41% of donor projects are reflected in that budget 
(Christiansen et al, 2007; MoH, 2007).  
In education the vast majority of sector funding is still channelled as budget support 
via government systems (a combination of general and sector budget support) – more 
so than in water and health – and alignment is considered strong. However, for a 
variety of reasons including concerns about the quality of implementation and poor 
donor coordination, project funding is now on the increase. 
Harmonisation: In the water sector, harmonisation is strong. Donors coordinate 
actions in a joint group and organise support through a basket fund (the Joint 
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Partnership Fund) with its own harmonised accounting procedures. The JWSSPS 
encompasses all donor support in the sector under a single programme but does not 
represent further harmonisation of donor procedures (MoWE et al, 2007).  
In health, donor coordination is active but key gaps remain in coordinating with UN 
agencies and some major NGOs operate outside the SWAp. The majority of aid is 
provided as projects with no harmonised procedures, though the government is now 
seeking to rationalise these into fewer but larger programmes. The education sector 
also has a donor coordination group but not all donors are said to work through it 
which results in weak coordination. Donors in these sectors do not use harmonised 
procedures or a basket fund, and work directly with local government to a greater 
extent than in the water sector.  
Managing for Results is considered moderate to strong in the water sector with a clear 
monitoring system and review process based on 10 “golden indicators”, and 
reasonable follow-up on undertakings as a result of an annual sector review. The 
JWSSPS aims to strengthen monitoring with the adoption of new milestones. This 
leaves open the option of tying aid to performance, if donors choose to adopt this 
route, and to promoting greater alignment among donors who hesitate to align 
because of concerns about performance. In comparison, the government reporting and 
monitoring system is perceived to be slightly weaker in the education sector with less 
follow up of the results of sector reviews. On paper, annual sector performance 
reports appear of similar quality and scope in all three sectors.   
Mutual accountability is considered moderate to strong in water, according to the 
Paris indicators shown above. Donors share information on planned activities with 
government in the sector working group and an annual joint sector review process 
includes all major stakeholders including civil society and the private sector. 
Predictability of aid, which can be seen as an outcome of mutual accountability, is 
high in the water sector at 97% (if off-budget funding to the parastatal NWSC is 
excluded), but weaker in health creating a challenge to planning (MoWE, 2007; MoH, 
2007). None of the sectors, however, have a formal mechanism to hold donors to 
account for their commitments, and holes in sector budgets mean that none of them 
feel able to refuse aid in whatever form and for whatever purpose it is offered.     
3.3  Ethiopia  
In Ethiopia, progress towards the PPs was moderate overall, according to the 2006 
OECD survey. At sector level, progress was ahead in education followed by health 
and then water. The water sector shows slower progress overall because a coordinated 
effort to develop a sector-wide approach started only in 2005 in the sector, while 
similar efforts have been ongoing in health and education since 1997/8. The short 
timeframe of engagement in water means that the sector does not yet have all the 
‘mechanics’ of a SWAp in place; nevertheless the sector has made much progress 
since 2005.  
A feature that cuts across the three sectors in Ethiopia is the Protection of Basic 
Services project (PBS), a block grant that co-finances basic social services including 
education, health and water. The PBS was designed as an alternative to direct budget 
support as donors no longer felt politically able to contribute resources directly to the 
treasury after the government’s violent clampdown on the opposition and protestors 
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contesting the results of the 2005 general elections.10  In practice the PBS 
predominantly covers salaries, which leads the education sector to take the lion’s 
share of PBS with 38%, compared to 10% in health and only 4% for water (PFMC, 
2007). As a result, the education sector is more aligned than other social sectors in 
Ethiopia.   
Ownership is moderate to strong in the water sector. Whilst the government-led 
Universal Access Plan sets the ambitious target of 100% coverage by 2012, the plan is 
not yet linked to a strong sector development programme and performance monitoring 
system. Having established an inter-sectoral coordination office on water, sanitation 
and hygiene at the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) in late 2007, the 
government is now in theory in a good position to exercise leadership over the sector 
development process. In comparison, the health sector takes ‘assertive’ ownership of 
its sector development programme, and has a clear vision, strategy for implementation 
and emerging performance-based monitoring information system. With a Health 
Harmonisation Manual, the sector is strongly pushing donors to adhere to ‘one plan, 
one budget and one report’.  The education sector also sets out clear and ambitious 
goals and a vision in its sector development programme. 
Alignment In the water sector, policy alignment is progressing under a multi-
stakeholder forum, a process which aims to lead towards a SWAp. In December 2007, 
a common bi-annual sector review mechanism was agreed and the sector financing 
strategy (EUWI, 2007) of May 2007 sets out a road map towards a joint financing 
agreement. In 2007, 47% of donor funding was recorded as ‘on budget’ (Thomson, 
2007), but the percentage has increased substantially since then with important donors 
(DFID, UNICEF and WB) switching to ‘on budget’ funding after a joint review 
mission in May 2007. As an important intermediate step towards systems alignment, 
donors have joined together separate Project Implementation Units (PIUs) into a 
single sector coordination unit and a sector-wide Programme Implementation Manual 
(PIM) is currently under preparation. Procurement and financial reporting is a serious 
hurdle for sector aid effectiveness. Donor systems are used for financial reporting and 
procurement. The high standard of these systems slows down disbursement and 
spending of funds leading to a significant underutilisation of the sector budget (Tayler 
and Winpenny, 2006 in: RiPPLE, 2007). 
In the health sector, policy alignment is weak to moderate as vertical programmes 
distort the planning, budgeting implementation and monitoring process and drain 
important staff resources. Over 60% of donor funding is directed to three particular 
health outcomes, HIV/Aids followed by tuberculosis and malaria at the expense of 
overall basic health care (MoH, 2008).  
Education has the strongest alignment, partly because the proportion of recurrent 
budgeting, which is channelled through PBS, is highest in this sector. Funding for 
most other areas of support is channelled through an on-budget pooled fund.  
Harmonisation is moderate in the water sector. Donors engage through a donor 
assistance group as is the case in other sectors, and increasingly carry out joint review 
missions and common sector assessments. In 2007, the PIUs of the WB, UNICEF, 
and the AfDB were joined together while DFID let go of most project inputs by co -
financing the World Bank's agreed procedures. In health, harmonisation is weak to 
                                                 
10 The PBS funding is provided to the treasury consolidated account but earmarked as a contribution to 
the Federal GoE's Block grant allocation to the regions - that way donors can deal with domestic 
political sensitivities by being seen to bypass the Federal Government.   
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moderate despite of the strong lead of the health sector ministry. A number of 
development partners signed up to the International Health Partnership in 2008, but 
there is still disengagement from the part of important vertical programmes. The 
education sector is generally well harmonised with monthly donor coordination 
meetings, regular sector government-donor interactions and well established donor-
government task forces on particular issues.   
Managing for Results: The water sector’s monitoring and information system (MIS) 
is the weakest link in the sector, complicated by the fact that the MIS is spread across 
water health and education. Simple, common reporting formats are under discussion 
as a starting point for developing sector-wide monitoring, and reflecting one of the 
key sector undertakings in 2008. Health and education show a more positive picture: 
in the health sector, performance-based monitoring is in the process of being rolled 
out and the education sector is seen to have a solid MIS in place.   
Mutual accountability mechanisms are emerging in water with the forth joint 
technical review planned for 2008. In health and education, these mechanisms have 
been running for several years but the continued disengagement from the part of some 
development partners hampers progress particularly in the health sector.11 
3.4 Bangladesh 
The OECD 2006 baseline survey on monitoring the Paris Declaration rated 
Bangladesh’s performance against each of the five PP as moderate. The tone of the 
report is one of “cautious optimism” (Evans, forthcoming): Bangladesh is moving 
slowly but surely towards greater alignment and the publication of the full PRSP in 
2005 was seen as a major step forward (GoPRB, 2005).  On average 53% of aid for 
the government sector uses Bangladesh’s own public financial management systems, 
largely in the form of budget support, and 48% of aid uses national procurement 
systems (OECD, 2007).  Four donors (ADB, DFID, Japan and WB) who collectively 
account for around 80% of the ODA flows to the social sectors have prepared a Joint 
Assistance Strategy which is aligned with the PRSP. DFID is supporting the creation 
of a MTEF involving 20 ministries although this process is extremely slow (Riddell, 
2007). 
The health and education sectors appear to be somewhat ahead of water in terms of 
implementing some of the PPs, with a track record of SWAps in both sectors. The 
water sector remains extremely projectised and ongoing efforts to reform macro-
planning and financial systems12 do not include water. However, while some of the 
accepted mechanisms for improving aid effectiveness are in place, even within the 
water sector, the spirit of the PPs is weak and in the case of health may indeed be 
weakening. While water has clearly lagged historically in the adoption of SWAp 
mechanisms in Bangladesh, the difference is not as great as it first appears, and the 
recent small steps taken in the water sector may in fact prove more robust in the 
longer term than larger steps made by other sectors. 
   
Ownership: In the water sector, ownership is weak. Government participation in the 
sectoral Local Consultative Group (LCG) has limited influence on national policy and 
                                                 
11 The indicator for mutual accountability refers to ‘mutual assessments in place’. If interpreted more 
broadly—i.e. regarding predictability of funding—then judgement would be less positive for health and 
education in Ethiopia.  
12 Such as recent DFID-supported efforts to develop a Medium-term Budgetary Framework for priority 
sectors under the PRSP 
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efforts to develop a comprehensive sector development plan are seen as being led by a 
small donor group under the leadership of Danida13. However some progress has been 
made in two sub-sectors: rural sanitation, where a highly successful project has 
triggered the government to take leadership and organise the sector around a 
consolidated approach; and in the urban water sector where key partners have worked 
with government to establish a joint development plan within the context of a multi-
year investment program for two major cities14. 
The Bangladesh health sector programme is one of the oldest and largest SWAPs 
(White 2007), but although government leadership was once strong, a recent review 
suggests that donor influence has increased considerably since the 1980s and there is 
now little ownership of the current sector strategy by government (Martinez, 2008). 
In education, the current Primary Education Development Program (PEDP2) is a sub-
sectoral program which leaves out part of the sector and one of the ministries 
responsible for education. The lead donor has reportedly dominated or attempted to 
dominate much of the dialogue and PEDP2 is generally viewed as a collection of 
projects in parallel with the government’s education program (Riddell, 2007). 
Alignment: Policy alignment takes place through coordination mechanisms such as 
the LCG on water, though the role of these bodies in policy is weak. Systems 
alignment is still weaker – the majority of aid flows in the sector are projectised, and 
water has not been included in DFID’s support to the preparation of an MTEF. Some 
small steps have been made towards multi-year funding commitments from several 
donors in the urban water sector. 
In health, policy alignment is weak, and donors prioritise certain areas in stand-alone 
projects. With regard to aligning systems, donors continue to channel funding 
bilaterally and to be heavily involved in day-to-day aspects of the health sector.  
Procurement for the SWAp goes through the government system. PIUs however 
continue to proliferate due to the projectised nature of much of the sector. 
In education, policy alignment extends only to the formal primary education sector, 
and even then several significant actors are not aligned, including those in the NGO 
sector who play a significant role.  Systems alignment is relatively weak – even in 
primary education some 21% of expenditure is off-budget and falls outside of PEDP2. 
In 2006, 20% of total foreign assistance for the sector was in the form of budget 
support accounting for some 5% of total public expenditure. These percentages are 
predicted to fall in 2007 (Riddell, 2007). 
Harmonisation:  In the water sector there have been some small steps towards 
harmonisation which have had mixed success. The Sector Development Plan, now in 
the process of revision, is seen by some as a donor effort to harmonise their 
approaches. Small practical steps have been taken in rural sanitation and urban water 
supply to harmonise policy and link this to planned investments.  
In the health sector a history of disagreement and mistrust between donors has 
hampered efforts to harmonise, and this is said to be exacerbated by lack of leadership 
if not ‘competition’ between different departments in the Ministry of Health 
                                                 
13 The lack of a strong unified leadership is perhaps best demonstrated by the PRSP document 
(GoPRB, 2005) which cites water and sanitation as one of eight priority sectors, but provides little or 
no sectoral or policy guidance within the technical sections of the report. Indeed the PRSP as a whole 
lacks vision and focus and few sectors are treated with sufficient detail.  
14 In urban water however these commitments have not as yet yielded the most urgent policy 
commitments, and there is no sign that the linked donor contributions will be delivered in anything 
other than a traditional project mode. 
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(Martinez, 2008, White, 2007). The Health, Nutrition and Population Sector 
Programme (HNPSP) does have joint supervision which has been moderately 
successful although missions may comprise up to 70 staff, and 19% of the HNPSP 
Budget—about half of the ODA funding to it—is channelled through a pooled fund. 
In education, observers report that ‘coordination and harmonisation of the donors’ 
group is still incomplete’ (Riddell, 2007).  In addition, donors continue to support 
NGO-delivery outside of PEDP2; a consortium of five donors has established parallel 
sub-sector pooled funding with joint supervision and its own monitoring system. 
Managing for Results:  There is a distinct lack of reliable, and mutually acceptable, 
monitoring systems which can deliver information against the agreed plans. This  
point has been noted particularly in health where the HNPSP has two separate and 
different monitoring frameworks supported by different donors, neither of which can 
deliver the required data.  In the rural sanitation sector, where there is at least a 
commonly agreed policy, disagreements still arise over the interpretation of data. In 
education there has been little effort to measure quality and outcomes15.  
Mutual Accountability:  Here again the story is rather bleak in all three sectors. The 
HNPSP has a system of Annual Performance Reviews with high quality analysis, but 
this is reported to have had little impact on policy decisions (White, 2007).  In 
education there is some joint assessment within PEDP2, but again achieving little 
impact on future policy or implementation.  In water no joint reviews are planned. 
                                                 
15 According to DFID Bangladesh, a UNICEF-Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics led survey in 2006 
found sanitation coverage to be 39.2%, whilst the GoB reported through its DPHE-led monitoring 
system that coverage was 85%.  The reason for this discrepancy is the different definitions used by the 
national program when compared to the international monitoring system and is not by itself an 
indicator of lack of mutual accountability. What is of more concern is the lack of debate and dialogue 
on how to interpret and make best use of monitoring systems which measure two very different 
indicators of progress.  
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4 Reasons for differences in progress  
In this section we analyse why progress against the PPs has varied between countries 
and sectors. The findings in section 3 have shown that variations in progress are more 
significant between the three case study countries than they are between sectors across 
countries. The findings also show that no single sector shows greater progress than 
others. This points to the importance of a country’s political economy16 and sector 
governance in making progress against the PPs. 
At the same time, section 2 revealed some fundamental differences in the aid 
architecture of the three sectors which also determines progress against the PPs. The 
health sector, for example, stands out for its large volume of vertical funding which 
raises particular issues for policy alignment; the water sector, on the contrary, has 
larger volumes of project-type investment via multilateral development banks. For 
donors, the 2006 OECD baseline survey suggests that they have an mixed track record 
with little evidence except for maybe DFID and the US that there are ‘Paris friendly’ 
or ‘Paris unfriendly’ donors within any of the three sectors we are considering. These 
differences loose importance by the fact that most of the top 10 ODA donors are the 
same for the three sectors.  At country level in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda, 
there is no coherent pattern of donor progress against the Paris indicators.  
Our analysis uses a governance lens examining institutional aspects, the role of actors 
and structural aspects governing the sector.  
The section is organised along the five PPs. Under each principle, we compare the 
levels of progress across sectors and countries. We then raise particular issues which 
impact on progress towards the PPs leading on to lessons and opportunities for future 
engagement.   
4.1 Ownership  
Ownership provides the organising principle around which aid can be aligned and 
harmonised. Levels of ownership (as shown in Table 4) do not vary systematically 
between sectors, and differences between sectors are weak compared with those 
between countries. This indicates that levels of ownership are closely related to the 
broader political and governance situation within and beyond the sector. The concept 
needs to be further unpacked in order to provide a better understanding of the 
underlying barriers to greater ownership. Much of this relates to different dimensions 
of ownership. A number of key issues emerge from the analysis: 
National versus sector level: The scope of sector ownership is partly driven by the 
extent to which there is a drive towards a national poverty alleviation and pro-poor 
growth strategy at the national level. An example of strong ownership is Uganda in 
the late 1990s. Here a nationally-driven poverty eradication action plan process and 
signing of partnership principles underpinned relationships at a sector level. The 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development also took the lead along 
with sector ministries in driving the development of strong sector plans and strategies 
around which a SWAp could come together. In health and education, SWAps were 
pushed as a means to focus sector activity around the goals of universal healthcare 
and universal primary education, which were political priorities at the highest level. A 
                                                 
16 In this report political economy analysis refers to the “interaction of political and economic processes 
in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals that create, 
sustain and transform these relationships over time”  as defined in ODI (2003). 
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lot of the impetus for greater aid effectiveness at sector level thereofore came from the 
leadership of the Ministry of Finance, and even the President. 
 
 Degrees of ownership within a sector: The degree of government ownership of a 
sector development strategy can also vary considerably within a sector. It is useful 
here to make a distinction between political and technical ownership. In the Ethiopian 
education sector, strong political ownership is expressed by the Minister chairing 
monthly meetings with donors. In the water sector by contrast there was technical 
leadership, but interaction has been less frequent and limited to a few higher officials. 
In Bangladesh, ownership of the sector development plan was mainly technical and 
limited to the division responsible for rural WSS although the policy also spans urban 
WSS.  
Barriers to broader ownership (technical and political) can be wide-ranging. In the 
Ethiopian water sector, during interviews reference was made to disincentives. At a 
personal level, fear of reputational risks may outweigh the potential gains of engaging 
in a sector-wide development process, particularly when the engagement process is 
not yet well established; transaction costs are high and donor behaviour uncertain. 
Other barriers relate to internal sector governance issues. In the Bangladesh health 
sector, for example, lack of leadership from the side of the sector government was 
underpinned by poor management and accountability: although responsibilities for 
programme implementation were in principle assigned to line directors, performance 
was generally not controlled. Lack of accountability was exacerbated by high staff 
turnover (28 out of 35 line directors were transferred between two programme 
reviews) and a mismatch in competencies (Martinez, 2008).  
Box 5: Decentralising Ownership in South Africa 
 
In addressing the pre-1994 backlog in water supply and sanitation, the newly elected government of 
South Africa embarked on a reform process specifically focused on water supply and sanitation. 
Although the new South African Constitution mandated local governments to provide water and 
sanitation services to people within their jurisdiction, early on the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) had been directly responsible for expanding basic services. Following the 
promulgation of local government legislation in the late 1990s, DWAF began to develop a new policy in 
2001, embracing the new decentralised framework.  The resulting draft policy which DWAF had 
prepared internally was presented to sector stakeholders in 2002.  However, it was not received well, 
with objections to both its substance and the process of its preparation.  In response, the 
department then instituted a consultation process that included all major national and local partners to 
develop a new again policy from scratch. The resulting framework, the Strategic Framework for Water 
Services, was remarkably similar in content to the previous draft policy. Yet, this time received buy-in 
from all major players including the municipalities.  
 
Several advantages arise from a collectively owned water policy: simply put, a policy prepared 
collaboratively is owned more widely and therefore, in theory, is easier to implement. Moreover, at the 
time the policy is promulgated there is likely to be greater understanding of the implications and 
coherence in interpretation. One key factor in the subsequent buy-in from local authorities was that the 
South African Local Government Association disseminated the policy to its members rather than the 
sector agency DWAF. 
 
Source: derived from Jones and Williamson, 2005 
Ownership for implementation? Ownership also extends to the implementation of the 
development strategy. If lower levels of government do not feel ownership, 
implementation of sector development plans—and with this ownership of 
development outcomes—can be limited. Barriers to ownership at lower government 
levels are inter alia related to institutional factors; for example, consultation with 
regional and local government might need strengthening in the planning process, as 
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illustrated by an example from South Africa illustrated in Box 5 above. Another 
important barrier to implementation is the lack of capacity at lower government levels 
to carry out planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring according to plan.  
 
Ownership that is inclusive or exclusive of civil society and the private sector? 
Although the PD makes reference to civil society and the private sector involvement 
in SWAPs, insufficient emphasis is placed on their involvement given their significant 
input into service delivery. In the study countries there are now nascent platforms for 
sector NGOs. In Uganda, UWASNET, the national network of sector NGOs, has 
signed an MoU with MoWE for NGO coordination, capacity building, and support to 
local governments to work with NGOs and CBOs (UWASNET, 2003). Of 
approximately 400 NGOs operating in the sector, 200 are UWASNET members and 
80 of them share detailed information on their activities with the sector. In the 
Bangladesh education sector donors have gone as far as setting up a parallel 
mechanism including a pooled fund with one NGO, BRAC that works on non-formal 
education (Riddell, 2007). On a related note, there is concern among NGOs that the 
Paris Agenda in fact diverts funding to government sources and away from other 
implementers, possibly leading to ‘institutional mono-cropping’—where there is a 
single large, potentially monolithic, implementing approach dominated mainly by 
government. Barriers to greater engagement from local non-governmental institutions 
may be a lack of capacity to engage in policy debates or a history of active avoidance 
of government. This raises key questions about the nature of power, and its exercise, 
within sector-wide approaches, many of which remain unresolved (see Hyden, 2008). 
Undesired direction of ownership? Finally, ownership of development processes can 
take a direction that donors politically disagree with and do not want to align to. 
Examples exist in all sectors. In the water sector, for example, the government might 
decide to increase the ratio of budgeting for the urban sector to secure votes while 
donors would like to see the bulk of the budget allocated to the poorest parts of the 
population who generally live in rural areas.   
 
The following lessons emerge:  
Foster positive incentives: Fostering positive incentives for government (and civil 
society actors) to increase ownership is an important yet often overlooked ingredient 
for advancing ownership. Some practical activities in this direction are: finding a 
neutral broker among sector donors—ideally a donor with no particular spending 
pressure attached—to drive forward a SWAp process. In Ethiopia, Italian Cooperation 
was able to do just that under the EUWI-initiated process to develop a SWAp.  
Put more effort into developing widely-owned development strategies: More work 
may be needed to evaluate broadly how to support a domestically-developed policy. 
The process should be led by government including, for example, identifying the need 
for and contracting technical assistance. More flexible funding could be made 
available to consult with and involve professional and civil society groups and to 
identify and support champions within these groups who could build policies on 
existing good practice in-country. One such example is the Ethiopian rural sanitation 
sector where the Water and Sanitation Programme, through flexible technical 
assistance was able to support the development and implementation of a national 
sanitation strategy and protocol that built on existing good practice (WSP, 2007). 
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A SWAp should seek to strengthen intra-governmental relationships: In Uganda 
strengthening the relationship between central and local government has been a key 
feature of SWAps in all three sectors. Local government has a key role in planning, 
takes part in sector reviews and receives ongoing support from the centre to be able to 
properly accomplish their role. One reason that coordination is more streamlined in 
Uganda’s water sector is that donors do not bypass central processes as much as in 
health and education where more donors work directly with local government.  
4.2 Alignment  
Alignment refers to the nuts and bolts of the PD through sector-wide approaches and 
their associated planning, financing and monitoring tools.  
Alignment requires the development of a comprehensive sector programme around 
which donors can organise their support through developing assistance strategies, 
channelling financial support including through GBS, using the recipient country’s 
procurement and financial systems and working with the government’s own 
monitoring framework in a timely and predictable fashion, ideally through untied aid.   
Overall, the level of alignment in the water sector was strong in Uganda, moderate in 
Ethiopia and weak in Bangladesh. The health sector performed relatively poorly in all 
three countries. Furthermore, there are also differences at a sub-sector level between 
the three countries. Whereas in Uganda and Ethiopia progress towards a SWAp is 
greatest in rural water supply and sanitation and small urban towns in Ethiopia, in 
Bangladesh alignment is more advanced in the urban sub-sector and in rural 
sanitation. Below, a distinction is made between issues arising under policy and 
systems alignment. 
4.2.1 Policy Alignment 
Aid modalities matter for prioritising areas of need: A particular problem in the 
health sector is the alignment of development partner funding with a consistent sector 
development programme, largely due to the distorting influence of major vertical 
funding streams. The health sector is an extreme example where the global aid 
architecture of the sector—i.e. vertical, multi-donor programmes directing funding to 
particular health outcomes—can create a major bottleneck towards policy alignment 
at a country level (see also section 2). In Ethiopia, for example, more than 60% of 
donor financing is vertically targeted at three particular health outcomes: HIV/AIDS, 
TB and Malaria while, combined, the three diseases account for 19% of deaths 
(WHO, 2006; FDRE, 2008). The imbalance between levels of funding and sector 
priorities and the separate administrative mechanisms attached to some resources have 
had a profoundly negative impact on sector capacity to plan and prioritise effectively.  
These major vertical funding programmes are not seen to the same extent in education 
and water, but the typically project-based nature of donor financing for a sub-sector 
may have a similar though less extreme effect if the sector is not free to determine the 
appropriate allocation of funds between different sub-sectors. In Uganda, for example, 
project and basket funding to the urban sector is high which makes it difficult for the 
government to reallocate these funds to rural areas. 
Policy alignment is affected by ownership: Policy alignment is more straightforward 
in cases where there is a clear policy or strategy as, for example, in the Bangladesh or 
Ethiopia rural sanitation sectors. If the policy direction is not clear, policy alignment 
becomes more difficult and systems alignment may suffer as a result. In Bangladesh 
the water sector has two policies relating to rural water: the 1998 Safe Drinking Water 
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and Sanitation policy and the 2004 Arsenic Mitigation policy, with contradictory 
positions that include the approach taken to service delivery and on community 
contributions to capital costs. The sector’s inability to find common ground on the 
issue has slowed down disbursement of funds (e.g. the WB’s) with adverse effects on 
implementation. Incoherence at the policy level is probably also why the sub-sector 
remains highly projectised. Furthermore, aligning with sector policies also becomes 
an issue when donors do not agree with the priorities set by a sector, or perceive that 
the government is not acting in a ‘pro-poor’ manner.  This can have a knock-on effect 
on systems alignment if the donor tends towards project financing in order to avoid 
signing up to the government programme.  
Problems in alignment are linked to power imbalances: Power imbalances between 
donors and government can hold back alignment, particularly in more aid-dependent 
countries like Ethiopia and Uganda. Not one of the sector ministries in our study 
countries felt that they could refuse new offers for funding however presented, 
because of the low funding of their sector budgets. They therefore put up little 
defence against the risk that poorly-aligned funding could distort their policy 
priorities. Globally there are relatively few examples of sectors refusing funds 
because they were not ‘well-enough aligned’. The underlying problem here is the 
difference in leverage between donors and recipient governments and the basic 
asymmetric power between the two. 
4.2.2 Systems Alignment 
Different types of delivery systems require different aid modalities: Delivery systems 
differ both between and within the sectors studied, with consequences for 
appropriateness of funding mechanisms. The water sector has characteristics of both a 
social and an infrastructure sector, but is generally more capital-intensive in nature 
than health and education. At a regional level in Ethiopia, for example, capital costs 
accounted for 74% of expenditure on water but only 10% of expenditure on education 
(PFMC, 2007). Rural water infrastructure and small-scale piped systems in urban 
centres can typically be delivered in similar ways to classroom construction, using 
government systems and capacity. Piped systems for large urban water delivery, on 
the other hand, require a projectised financing approach: initial costs are high and 
investments are lumpy, often spanning more than a year. Procurement and project 
management is necessarily complex and implemented in any public sector by project-
type mechanisms. In aid-dependant countries, such infrastructure is largely delivered 
via donor projects, and there is typically no government system for donors to align 
funding to. Demanding systems alignment for such complex investments may have 
limited returns.  
Systemic weaknesses exist across sectors and the scope for using government systems 
is often similar: GBS is seen as the ideal systems alignment approach because it uses 
government systems in full. However, concerns about corruption or political violence 
can cause donors to hold back or even change their approach (e.g. from GBS to PBS 
in Ethiopia). These issues can be addressed only to a limited extent by a sector, 
however strong its own record. 
The use of procurement and financial reporting, two of the key indicators for systems 
alignment, is also subject to the broader governance context surrounding the sector. 
As a result, the scope for using government PFM and procurement systems tends to 
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be similar across sectors.17 In Ethiopia, for example, the Protection of Basic Services 
(PBS) Fund is a modality that cuts across basic services sectors. Administered by the 
World Bank and earmarked as a contribution to the Federal Government’s block grant 
allocation to regional governments, the PBS is mainly used for recurrent expenditures, 
i.e. salaries at district level. The modality has been judged a success for its timely and 
efficient provision of resources (Thomsen, 2007). In Uganda, notionally-earmarked 
sector budget support channelled through the Poverty Action Fund is also used as a 
modality across the three sectors. This helps to ensure predictability in funding at 
sector level. The use of government systems has also proved less vulnerable to cuts 
than GBS. A key lesson from Uganda is that the use of government systems via 
budget support has facilitated the strengthening of those systems.  
Using donor systems can lead to limited absorption capacity: The failure to align with 
national systems is usually justified by the poor functioning of these systems or by 
wider governance concerns. However, donor systems are often too demanding for the 
limited capacity available in recipient countries, hence causing significant hurdles in 
delivering services. In the Ethiopian water sector, the use of parallel procurement and 
PFM systems at local level in the past has overburdened local government staff and 
led to significant under-utilisation of available sector funding. Woreda (district) water 
desk officers have had to take on financial reporting under the government 
procurement system which is neither their responsibility nor a role for which they are 
trained. Of total funding to the sector in 2005/6, estimates of absorption were around 
61% (Tayler and Winpenny, 2006 in: RiPPLE, 2007) with serious consequences for 
service provision. With the current switch to on-budget funding these problems are 
now likely to ease as PFM will be carried out by staff of the Bureau of Finance and 
Economic Development.18 
Issues surrounding the predictability of funding vary between sectors: Differences are 
evident between sectors in predictability of funding. The health sector is particularly 
affected by highly volatile funding (OECD DAC, 2007). This is reflected at a country 
level in both Ethiopia and Uganda. Ethiopia, for example, has currently no health 
sector funding commitments beyond 2010, while in Uganda the percentage of 
budgeted aid disbursed in the health sector in 2006-7 varied among donors from 46% 
to over one thousand percent (MoH, 2007).  
In both these countries predictability was not a major concern in the water sector. In 
Uganda 97% of promised funds were released, excluding off-budget funding to the 
National Water and Sewerage Corporation. In Ethiopia, the delay in implementation 
was linked to bottlenecks created by donor PFM rules rather than delays in budget 
release. Another issue in the Ethiopian water sector was the lack of alignment of 
funding and review mechanisms with the Ethiopian fiscal year.   
An underlying tension with regard to the predictability of funding cuts across sectors: 
while donors seek to provide aid over longer periods of time they may wish to retain 
the right to withdraw it or move away from budget support to more ad hoc 
mechanisms in the face of governance problems or political change, or indeed poor 
                                                 
17 Depending on their rules and regulations, development partners are not all capable of aligning to the 
same extent to a given system.  
18 There are counter arguments, however. In the Ugandan water sector, government procurement 
mechanisms can be slow and bureaucratic at the centre and donors sometimes slip back to using their 
own systems if they need something accomplished quickly, e.g. hiring a consultant. While it is 
recognised that this is not ideal, it does not seem to have had negative consequences. 
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performance by sectors. The issue here is how to strike an appropriate balance 
between legitimate demands of predictability and conditionality.  
 
The following lessons emerge: 
Policy alignment is important for supporting ownership and can be pursued 
independent of systems alignment: Policy alignment can be a starting point for greater 
systems alignment, and, where necessary, as a way of encouraging governments to 
improve and streamline procurement systems, etc. It points to the need to understand 
the complexity of change to political economies occasioned by new modalities of aid 
provision, the need to manage sequencing of new processes carefully and to be 
responsive to difficulties that emerge during the implementation of new arrangements.  
The distinct financing needs of the rural and urban sub-sectors require more nuanced 
systems alignment: The rural and small-scale urban water and sanitation sub-sectors 
are more adapted to funding through government systems. The Ugandan case shows 
that even if absent at the outset, such systems can be built whilst channelling funding 
through the budget, as opposed to using pooled funds. This ensures government, not 
donor systems, are strengthened. Large-scale urban water and sewerage infrastructure 
investments by contrast are characterised by multi-year project-type investments, even 
in mature economies. Project-type financing arrangements are needed to deal 
adequately with these types of investments. Importantly, project-type financing still 
needs to be aligned with policies and plans, even if they do not use government 
systems.  
Do no harm: In areas where alignment with government systems is not possible, 
donors should put more emphasis on the ‘do no harm’ principle. In particular, they 
should avoid creating bottlenecks that severely slow down delivery of basic services. 
Failure to deliver can undermine government accountability (and legitimacy) to 
citizens, can negatively impact on country ownership and may create reputational risk 
for donors. More care should be taken in ex-ante assessments of local-level capacity 
to adhere to donor rules and use – if not exact government rules – at least government 
PFM personnel as far as possible.  
There is scope to apply common forms of systems alignment across sectors: The use 
of different funding modalities and of procurement and PFM mechanisms is 
dependent on national systems and therefore similar across sectors. This means that 
there is scope to use funding modalities across sectors that are less disruptive for 
intra-governmental relations. The PBS in Ethiopia and PAF in Uganda are positive 
examples.  
How to counterbalance development partner dominance? Much aid in SWAps 
remains ‘bad’ in the sense that it is volatile (i.e. health), not provided in the right time 
frame (i.e. in line with recipient country fiscal calendars) or comes with conditions 
attached reflecting development partner rules and procedures. Many of these issues 
cannot be solved at the sector, let alone country, level. A form of ‘mutual 
cartelisation’19 among recipient countries could be encouraged to increase their 
leverage to actively demand development partners to stick to their commitments. 
Occasions for sector officials to exchange experiences on problems they are facing 
with donor behaviour could be a first step in this direction. Having ministers from 
                                                 
19 This suggestion was put forward by Paolo De Renzio during a public meeting at ODI, 4th April 2008: 
Practical Challenges in Meeting the Paris Declaration: Predictability, Technical Assistance and 
Division of Labour. 
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recipient countries sit on the board of a vertical fund or creating a panel or donor 
review committee that could have a sector-specific aspect to it would be another 
possibility.   
In the health sector there are now some innovations that aim at improving health 
outcomes. The International Health Partnership, for example, brings together a 
number of recipient countries, bi- and multilateral donors and private foundations, to 
improve donor coordination up to an international level. As well as coordination it 
also seeks to increase the focus on health systems as a whole as supposed to particular 
health outcomes, and to support countries’ own health plans.20  
4.3 Harmonisation 
Harmonisation aims to reduce transaction costs for recipient governments through 
improved coordination between donors. This can take the form of pooling resources, 
delegating responsibilities, unifying procedures such as reporting, division of labour, 
silent partnerships and other activities. The PD indicators measure the degree of 
harmonisation by the increase of joint missions and joint analysis among donors.  
While in Bangladesh harmonisation was weak to moderate in all three sectors, it fared 
slightly worse in the health sector compared to education and water in both Ethiopia 
and Uganda. Below, particular issues are identified and lessons drawn on how to deal 
with them. 
Positive steps towards harmonisation have been taken in all contexts: In all three 
sectors of the three case countries donors have organised themselves under 
coordination groups and have established arrangements to pool resources. However, 
the degree of coordination and of joint funding arrangements differs between sectors 
and countries. In Ethiopia, where the SWAp in the water sector is still in a nascent 
stage and some sector donors cannot easily use harmonisation and alignment 
mechanisms, there is nevertheless a good spirit of cooperation and the main donors 
have assumed complementary roles. In the Bangladesh health and education sectors, 
on the contrary, mistrust between donors and in some cases with sector institutions 
has acted as a barrier and greatly limited the positive effects of harmonisation. For 
example the quality of the dialogue in Bangladesh remains formal and diplomatic and 
fails to address urgent day-to-day issues such as delays in procurement etc (Martinez, 
2008). 
Harmonisation is limited by the non-participation of some development partners: 
Globally private aid now makes up approximately a third of total development aid 
according to Kharas (2007). In addition, new donors such as China and vertical 
funding mechanisms are on the rise. This means that a significant and rising 
proportion of actors and initiatives may be working outside the PD framework. This 
was also reflected at the country level where, in each sector, reference was made to 
donors that did not actively participate in harmonisation efforts thereby weakening 
potential effects overall. The health sector stood out in all three countries for being 
particularly complex due to a higher number of actors21. Coordination is also made 
particularly challenging due to the characteristics of ‘new’ actors prevalent in the 
sector such as private foundations and vertical funding mechanisms which are often 
                                                 
20 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/ihp/default.asp  
21 Numbers of donors per sector are difficult to obtain at country level because not all development 
partners actively engage in sector coordination and are therefore not always captured.   
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geared towards particular development outcomes—e.g. polio eradication or 
HIV/AIDS.  
In the water sector, actors tend to be fewer and harmonisation therefore more 
manageable. Multilateral funds play a more important role than in health, though the 
rigidity of their systems can act as an important barrier. Centralised structures and 
high standards for reporting and accounting requirements are a typical problem that 
renders sector level coordination more difficult. For example, in Ethiopia the AfDB’s 
infrastructure advisor at country level is not authorised to take any decisions but has 
to refer all reports to Tunis.  
Some instruments of harmonisation show limited effectiveness to date: Two prominent 
instruments of harmonisation are the division of labour (DoL) and silent partnerships. 
With regard to DoL, the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and DoL has 
developed new ideas on how to use the comparative advantage of European 
bilaterals.22 The guidelines suggest, for example, that EU donors concentrate their 
activities on two focal sectors limiting their commitment in other sectors to GBS or a 
delegated partnership / cooperation agreement. However, applying the code remains 
voluntary and has resulted in few changes so far.23 Private foundations, international 
NGOs and Southern donors are currently not involved in the DoL exercise in spite of 
their significant contributions, raising questions with regard to the relevance of the 
exercise.  
Silent partnerships were not prevalent in the country case studies. The Ethiopian 
water sector is an example of an arrangement with elements leading to silent 
partnerships: for example DFID entered the sector in 2006 but left its five-year £75 
million injection of money to the sector largely to the WB by co-financing the latter’s 
existing procedures (DFID Ethiopia, 2007). In this way DFID avoided creating an 
additional delivery mechanism in a sector that still remains highly projectised—but 
risked putting all its eggs in one basket at the same time, particularly if the existing 
mechanism has not shown very positive results in terms of development outcomes. 
There is, therefore, concern over the effectiveness of the existing arrangement. Due to 
the demanding rules of the previous WB programme, underutilisation of funding was 
high in 2007 resulting in low absorption capacity. To date (June 2008) none of the 
DFID funding has actually been spent on service delivery—some seven months after 
pledging. In the Ugandan rural water sector by contrast, harmonisation around 
government procedures using sector budget support resulted in high levels of 
absorption. This also means that policy and systems alignment was automatic. The 
above examples highlight that harmonisation does not replace ownership and 
alignment and should, where possible, be oriented to recipient government 
procedures. Harmonising around procedures that lead to low levels of absorption 
capacity and service delivery is not productive in terms of development outcomes for 
poor people. 
 
The following lessons emerge: 
Harmonisation mechanisms need to draw on the non-traditional development 
partners: Unless new development partners participate in harmonisation efforts, the 
question arises whether these efforts will have the intended effect of reducing 
                                                 
22 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r13003.htm  
23 The limited application of the code of conduct may be related to its current design of only permitting 
donors to commit to two sectors. This may also lead to ‘orphan sectors’ that remain neglected.  
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transaction costs for recipient governments. This issue is important for all sectors but 
more urgent in health where the proportion of non-traditional donors and the number 
of actors is likely to be higher.  
Increasing the effectiveness of existing mechanisms: Evidence from the three case 
studies shows that even traditional donors who theoretically adhere to the PD agenda, 
do not always implement their commitments. Reasons for this relate to adverse 
incentive structures, mistrust between donors and rigid structures. Actions need to be 
taken to overcome these problems. 
With regard to mistrust, having an effective broker at the sector level who does not 
dominate the process but plays the role of a facilitator to foster a productive working 
relationship among donors could be a key step forward.  
Changing internal incentives and relaxing rigid working procedures is in the hands of 
each individual donor. Stronger pressure should be exercised internationally to 
remove these internal barriers towards increased harmonisation.   
4.4 Managing for Results 
Managing for Results (MfR) entails recipient countries linking up sector strategies 
with budget allocation measured against results-oriented reporting. Donors are 
expected to harmonise M&E requirements and align them with the country’s sector 
framework.  
Results-based monitoring (RBM) is weak across the three sectors in Bangladesh. It 
was moderate to strong in the Ugandan water sector, a case known for its 10 golden 
indicators, and in the Ethiopian health sector where a new performance-based 
monitoring information system is being rolled out. The following issues arise:  
MfR is difficult when systematic monitoring and information systems are not yet in 
place and sector data remains contested. In some areas data from international 
monitoring programmes such as the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP)24 for the 
water sector differs substantially from data obtained by country-based monitoring 
systems—discrepancies can be as high as 25%. For example, in Ethiopia, access to 
rural water supply stood at 35% in 2005 according to sector internal monitoring 
(MoWR, 2006) while JMP data for 2004 estimate that 11% of the rural population 
had access to water supply. Similarly, in Bangladesh, according to DFID, a UNICEF-
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics-led survey in 2006 found sanitation coverage to be 
39.2%, whilst the GoB reported through its monitoring system that coverage was 
85%.  Discrepancies are partly related to different criteria used and highlight the need 
to agree a common definition of access as a starting point for sector monitoring. 
Furthermore, there is also a need to improve national data collection mechanisms to 
underpin planning and performance management. The recent aid effectiveness review 
by the World Bank focuses on MfR and calls on donors to support statistical agencies 
and to give monitoring greater prominence in SWAps (World Bank, 2007).  
Parallel donor reporting increases transaction costs for recipient governments: When 
strong monitoring systems are not in place, donors tend to rely on parallel monitoring 
programmes. Parallel reporting increases transaction costs and diverts resources away 
from important governmental reporting lines between local government and central 
ministries, from line ministries to ministries of finance or to parliament, and from 
government to its citizens.  
                                                 
24 The JMP for water supply and sanitation is a common initiative by the WHO and UNICEF(see also: 
www.wssinfo.org )  
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The development of RBM happens incrementally: The development of an RBM 
framework in the Ugandan water sector, set out in Box 6 below, sector is an example 
of good practice in this regard. 
The improvement in the Ugandan monitoring framework has resulted in donors 
increasingly relying on the government reporting system via the annual sector review 
process in the water sector.25 Donors can incorporate their concerns in the ToR of the 
sector reviews. Despite its relative success, it is recognised that the sector monitoring 
framework still needs further strengthening. This is now being taken forward under 
the Joint Water and Sanitation Sector Programme Support, which sets out new 
milestones to strengthen monitoring and enables donors to give performance-based 
aid.  
Box 6: Developing RBM in the Ugandan Water Sector 
In Uganda, first efforts towards improving monitoring started with a sector report in 2003 that evaluated 
data sources available and defined a number of themes that would lead to results-based reporting. A 
working group on sector performance was set up and five performance themes were selected: impact, 
quantity and quality, access and usage, equity and affordability, functionality and managerial 
responsibilities and value for money. 10 golden indicators were selected to measure progress in the five 
areas. The strategy for reporting was to continue to use existing information but to gradually improve its 
quality and accuracy. But, the process has also faced problems. Finding the appropriate institutional 
“home” for data analysis and interpretation was problematic and improving data quality was slow. 
Source: Pinfold, 2005  
 
The following lessons emerge:   
Strengthening monitoring systems is an iterative process: It is possible to establish a 
cycle of improvements in monitoring. The monitoring system put in place at the start 
of a SWAp process can later be built upon according to capacity in the sector and the 
concerns which arise out of early sector reviews. Rather than attempting a complex 
monitoring system at the outset, it may be more effective to start simple and later seek 
to increase the quality and type of indicators or performance standard demanded. In 
the Ethiopian water the first step is the use of common reporting formats for a 
technical sector review each May. The World Bank review found that it takes time to 
consolidate processes for strategy setting, budgeting and performance assessment into 
a coherent framework, and that the development of national results-oriented 
frameworks is strongest in countries with second-generation PRSPs (World Bank, 
2007). A similar pattern is seen between the three sectors in Ethiopia: MfR is quite 
strong in the health and education where a sector development plan has been in place 
since the late 1990s, but weak in water where the strategy is more recent.  
Effective MfR depends on the sector’s internal incentives to learn and to take 
informed decisions. The strength of monitoring systems is linked to internal incentives 
in the sector that can encourage or discourage informed decision making. In 
Bangladesh, for example, sector reviews are in place in all three sectors but the 
findings are rarely followed up. In the water sector in general, weak monitoring could 
partly be linked to the widespread use of parallel monitoring systems set up by donors 
or NGOs and the culture that once systems have been delivered, they are handed over 
to users. Contrary to the health and education sector, water sector officials are also 
                                                 
25Getting towards a single sector results framework requires creative thinking. In the case of Uganda, 
the sector indicators continued to be out of line with the Poverty Reduction Support Credit’s indicators 
used by the WB. Adopting a new indicator called “successful annual sector review” proved a way for 
the WB to drop the previous indicators that were out of tune with the 10 golden indicators emerging in 
the sector.   
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less well placed to monitor because of fewer staff and a general lack of capacity to 
carry out field monitoring.  
The level of corruption may determine the willingness of the government to develop 
an RBM framework. Perceived levels of corruption are a serious challenge in all three 
countries but worst in Bangladesh, which was 162nd out of 180 countries ranked 
according to the Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index in 2007. 
In Bangladesh where perceived levels of corruption are high, progress towards RBM 
has been particularly weak.   
Monitoring sanitation and hygiene poses a particular challenge: Sanitation and 
hygiene improvements are, unlike water supply, linked to behaviour change at 
household level. This makes monitoring outputs problematic, including increased 
numbers of latrines and hand washing facilities and their use, let alone health 
outcomes. In Bangladesh and in Ethiopia, innovative monitoring systems for 
measuring sanitation and hygiene improvements are currently being trialled.   
There are financial incentives for MfR for both donors and sector ministries: Donors 
have an interest in MfR because it enables them to demonstrate the impact of their aid 
to domestic constituencies, which will help to preserve budgets. At the same time, 
while performance monitoring has costs there are also financial incentives for sector 
ministries. In Uganda, ministries commented that if they could show results for their 
investments, it would enable them to lobby for funds from the Ministry of Finance. 
This is a significant motivation where sector budgets are under-resourced. However 
these twin incentives for donors and ministries may not be complementary if donor 
domestic constituencies demand parallel monitoring and reporting because of quality 
concerns or the need to use their own indicators.  
4.5 Mutual Accountability 
Under mutual accountability recipient countries committed to strengthening the role 
of parliament in developing plans and budgets and to reinforce participatory 
processes, while donors promised to provide timely, comprehensive and transparent 
information on aid flows. The PD indicator measures mutual accountability through 
the implementation of ‘mutual assessments’. In the three country case studies, mutual 
accountability was considered to be more positive in those sectors that had 
comparatively stronger SWAps in place such as the Ugandan water sector or the 
Bangladesh health sector. The following issues arise:  
 
Memoranda of Understanding signed as part of SWAps and related common review 
processes under SWAps can provide a platform for mutual accountability. If they are 
organised in an inclusive way, they can extend to local governments and civil society 
organisations. A good example is the sector review process in the Ugandan water 
sector where domestic constituencies demand a seat at the table during sector reviews.  
However, SWAp review processes are not a panacea and cannot overcome the 
difference in leverage between donors and recipients at country level. The same issues 
arise as under policy and systems alignment in section 4.2: In many health SWAps, 
recipient government and donors have developed so called “partnership principles”, 
but if donors are not willing or able to adhere to them, it is difficult for a sector 
government to take punitive action.  
Another barrier to mutual accountability is the fact that some donors do not have 
adequate representation at a country level making it is difficult for recipient 
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governments to engage with them. This goes for some of the global health funds such 
as GAVI and GFWTM. In other cases, e.g. the AfDB, donor staff are present in 
country but are bound by rules set by higher levels in their organisations, and 
recipient governments lack a platform to negotiate with the donor on an equal footing.  
Two lessons emerge.  
First, civil society organisations could play a stronger role in demanding mutual 
accountability. Although they take part in review processes, they have yet to play a 
strong advocacy role at sector level in any of the three case studies. For example, 
WSS NGOs could demand donors to be more transparent about their aid 
commitments and disbursements and then campaign for greater donor accountability 
in cases where they do not comply. However, such an advocacy role is relatively new 
for many NGOs and they may lack capacity and confidence in this area. In the 
Uganda water sector NGOs have a seat on all the sector working groups and sub-
groups, but they admitted frequent poor preparation for meetings and limited 
influence overall.  
Second, mutual accountability needs to be taken to a higher level to become 
meaningful. As referred to in section 4.2 on alignment, this could take various forms. 
Recipient government stakeholders could, for example, form donor review panels that 
judged the donor on performance in a particular sector. The recently-formed 
International Health Partnership is another example of how negotiations between 
donors and sector governments can achieve a higher level and thereby become more 
balanced. 
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5 Towards improved development outcomes?   
The focus of this study is on the performance of the three basic service sectors against 
the PPs. However, in practice, good performance against the PD does not 
automatically mean that aid is used more effectively and ultimately contributes to 
improved development outcomes at a sector level. Although analysing the critical 
relationship between AE and development outcomes was beyond the scope of this 
study, the following observations are useful.   
A mechanic adherence to the PD indicators will not necessarily improve the quality of 
aid or the delivery of aid outputs in the spirit of the Declaration. The reduction of 
transaction costs for recipient governments and a higher prioritisation of areas of need 
can serve as examples to illustrate the need to achieve a clearer idea how aid is being 
used more effectively:  
Transaction costs26: It is striking that while in all three mature SWAp processes in 
Uganda stakeholders noticed a reduction in transaction costs, in spite of the 
longstanding SWAps in Bangladesh there was no clear sign of reduced transaction 
costs. So while there may be more coordination meetings and pooled funding 
arrangements in place, the quality of aid relations does not seem to have improved 
substantially in Bangladesh.  
Prioritising areas of need: Do we know whether aligning aid to recipient countries 
national and sector development priorities and plans leads to better policy choices? 
For example, how do we know whether services are delivered as a result of 
development partners’ engagement with the PD? And, even further, do we know 
whether they are they allocated equitably and reach the most vulnerable?   
 
When looking at some key MDG indicators for the three sectors, an interesting picture 
emerges. Table 6 below shows key MDG indicators for the three basic service sectors 
in 1990 and 2004. The data is taken from global sources so as to allow for 
comparison.27  
There are clear trends in improved health and education, e.g. infant and under-five 
mortality fell in all three countries and gross enrolment went up in all three countries. 
However, the water sector shows less clear trends. Access to rural water improved 
only by 2% in Bangladesh, worsened in Ethiopia, but increased by 16% in Uganda. 
Access to rural sanitation improved substantially in Bangladesh i.e. from 12% to 35%, 
increased from 2% to 7% in Ethiopia but showed no changes in Uganda.  
What lies behind these trends? Have improvements (e.g. the sharp increase in 
sanitation coverage in Bangladesh) worked because or in spite of the international and 
national efforts towards greater AE? Or, is there maybe no link at all between national 
efforts towards harmonisation and alignment and improved sanitation coverage? 
Based on current knowledge it is difficult to attribute efforts towards the PD to 
improved development outcomes. But, ultimately, these are the links we need to make 
to better understand whether recipient governments and donors are making real 
                                                 
26 It has to be noted that objectively measuring transaction costs is difficult. Our findings are based on 
people’s perceptions and references in the literature.  
27 For water and sanitation, the most recent data available is from 2004, and this year is therefore taken 
as a benchmark although it does not take into account the last three years where the AE agenda has 
gained more momentum.  
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progress towards the spirit of the PD and are using aid more effectively to achieve 
greater development outcomes. 
Table 6: Changes in key development indicators between 1990 and 2004 
1data from 1991; 2data from 1995; 3data from 2000; 4data from 2005 
Source: www.mdgs.un.org; www.who.int.whosis; www.wssinfo.org  
 
 
Bangladesh 
  
Ethiopia 
  
Uganda 
 
  1990 2004 1990 2004 1990 2004 
WSS             
Access to urban water 83% 82% 81% 81% 80% 87% 
Access to rural water 69% 71% 15% 11% 40% 56% 
Access to urban sanitation 55% 51% 13% 44% 54% 54% 
Access to rural sanitation 12% 35% 2% 7% 41% 41% 
Health             
Maternal Mortality per 100,000 850 No data 1400 No data 880 
No 
data 
Infant Mortality per 1000 100 56 131 110 93 81 
Under Five Mortality per 100 149 77 204 166 160 138 
Education             
Gross Enrolment No data No data No data 91.3% 128%2  118% 
Net Enrolment 91.3% 97.6% 22.6%1 47.9% No data 93%4 
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6  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The objective of this study was to review the extent to which the PD principles are 
applied in the water sector in response to the assumption that the water sector is 
generally lagging behind the other basic social sectors such as health and education.  
The study has found that the water sector is not consistently underperforming in the 
three country case studies. Rather, we would argue that the situation is based on the 
inherent contexts of governance in each country within which the sector is embedded. 
The political-economic context and the behaviour of governance arrangement may 
well outweigh most inherent sector differences.  Below, we draw overall conclusions 
and recommendations. However, it is important to remember that this study is based 
on three country examples only. The trends shown here offer a good starting point for 
discussion but do not necessarily reflect any possible country situation.  
 
1. The broader governance environment is a more important influence on 
progress against the Paris Principles than sector characteristics. 
From our case studies differences in progress against the PPs are more pronounced 
between countries than between sectors. This indicates that aspects of the governance 
context—beyond the sector—rather than sector characteristics alone, are a key 
influence on progress. Whilst this may seem an obvious conclusion, it is often 
overlooked in the rush to judge progress by sector.  
Key factors supporting or hindering progress include the political commitment to 
poverty reduction and to the sectors in question, include the presence of strong 
financial and fiscal structures such as an MTEF, and effective institutions—including 
the relationships between different governmental and non-governmental bodies at 
different levels.  
In Uganda, where an MTEF has been in place for over 10 years, accompanied by 
strong ownership of the national development programme, a moderate or high level of 
progress has been possible in all three sectors. In Bangladesh, where budgeting 
processes are only weakly linked with the PRSP, ownership of the development 
programme is more limited and a high proportion of investment in human 
development sectors takes place outside government through major NGOs. This 
makes establishing effective SWAps a greater challenge. Progress in the sectors is 
undermined by weak ownership and a lack of faith in government systems. In a weak 
external environment, however, there are some steps which donors can take to bolster 
ownership at sector level as discussed in Section 4.  
 
Include a broader governance analysis when seeking to understand sector 
opportunities and barriers to progress against the PD: such an analysis could build 
on existing analysis including the Drivers of Change approach. This analytical 
framework could be developed further to look particularly at the sectoral politics of 
changes to aid architecture and the frequent assumptions about institutional behaviour 
brought by donor representatives without a good grounding in social science 
disciplines. Importantly, such analysis would take into consideration the political 
dynamics driving sector decision, personnel changes, and policy outcomes and the 
relationships of sector actors and institutions to wider political contexts (for example, 
in the Ethiopian context, the relationships between federal and regional level under a 
system of ethnic regions). This analysis would seek to understand the power 
 45
relationships between different actors at different levels and identify genuine 
leadership at sector level, e.g. how to nurture such leadership and avoid the sucking of 
good personnel and nascent leaders into the donor agencies themselves. Developing a 
more sophisticated analysis of the sectoral politics of development change responds to 
widespread acknowledgement that understanding politics is crucial for engaging at a 
sector level (see for example Martinez, 2008; White, 2007; Riddell, 2007; Hyden, 
2008; Booth, 2007; Plummer and Slaymaker, 2007). 
 
2. The perception that the water sector is lagging behind is not supported if the 
spirit rather than the mechanics of the PD is considered 
In all three countries, moves towards a SWAp have come later in the water sector than 
in health and education. Nevertheless, there had been further progress against the PPs 
in the water sector in Uganda than in health and education.  In Ethiopia and 
Bangladesh the instruments associated with the PD are less well developed in water 
compared to the other two sectors. Whilst this appears to suggest slower progress, our 
findings warn against such a mechanistic reading of progress and advocate for a more 
fluid notion based more on the spirit of the PD. The existence of instruments such as 
coordination mechanisms or sector reviews can mask shortcomings in the spirit of the 
PD. Bangladesh for example has a longstanding SWAp of sorts in both health and 
education but not in water, but these SWAps have not led to substantially more 
effective aid delivery because of weak government ownership and poor commitment 
from donors. To give a specific example, joint donor missions are undertaken in the 
education sector (one of the Paris indicators for alignment) but their effectiveness is 
limited by lack of trust between donors. The small steps taken so far in the water 
sector towards harmonisation and alignment may hold as much promise as the 
apparently well-developed SWAps in other sectors. Another example is the health 
sector where in spite of coordination mechanisms developed both at country level, 
progress continues to be undermined by the predominance of vertical funding and the 
volatility of funding.  
 
Mechanisms to foster the spirit of the PD are continual review and learning rather 
than implementing a pre-defined set of steps: The implementation of the Paris agenda 
in SWAPs or other instruments should not be seen as a one-off step but rather as an 
ongoing dynamic process. Progress is likely to stall or even decline for a variety of 
reasons. These may relate to changes in the prevailing governance and political-
economic environment, as in Ethiopia where donors have twice suspended budget 
support in response to concerns associated with conflict and human rights abuses, and 
the Ugandan education sector where donors are shifting some funds back into projects 
and NGOs because of governance concerns. Bottlenecks are also often encountered 
within sectors. The Ethiopian health sector is developing a strong performance 
monitoring framework but progress is hindered by donors who insist on reporting 
against their own priority outcomes. SWAPs should be a platform for learning for 
both donors and recipients, with continuous review of successes and obstacles to help 
ensure that aid effectiveness intent translates into service delivery outcome. This also 
implies there is no obvious sequencing of principles but that the pace and level of 
engagement depends on the opportunities at hand in a given situation.   
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3. Some dynamics are specific to particular (sub-) sectors and require a more 
targeted approach 
The type and number of actors and type and levels of financing differs between 
sectors. While all three sectors receive support from ‘traditional’ donors, levels of 
private aid and multi-lateral funding rapidly increase. The water sector is likely to be 
more affected by new donors such as China with a particular emphasis on 
infrastructure development while the health sector stands out for receiving high levels 
of aid from private foundations and multilateral funding initiatives tied to particular 
development outcomes. The implications for engagement differ and some lessons in 
this regard are drawn in section 4.3. However, most of the new actors have in 
common that they operate outside the framework of greater AE under the PD. As the 
contribution of these new actors at country level increases, the framework of AE risks 
losing its relevance. These are critical issues of international political economy in the 
aid environment that the sector could reflect upon at the upcoming Accra meeting. 
Another difference between sectors is linked to the delivery systems. Water is a 
‘hybrid’ sector, with characteristics of both social and infrastructure sectors. The 
urban sub-sector requires large infrastructure investments, whilst rural and small 
urban centres require small-scale investments. For rural WSS as well as for small 
towns the development and use of government systems as well as policy alignment is 
important as it is for the health and education sectors.  
 
Foster a mix of financing mechanisms in the water sector and a more sophisticated 
aid effectiveness debate: In all three case study countries, systems alignment is 
considered problematic for the urban sub-sector because it is dominated by project 
modalities and off-budget funding. However, as urban water supply demands large, 
‘lumpy’, multi-year investments, it is appropriate that they are funded through 
project-type mechanisms, which is the case in mature economies, as well. None of the 
case study countries currently has a government-owned mechanism in place for this 
type of investment, and it may thus be more appropriate to focus on policy alignment 
of aid in the urban sub-sector whether or not it is in project form.  It is essential that 
project funding does not undermine the incentives for urban water utilities to collect 
revenues from water users. Donors should support the development of innovative 
mechanisms for project-type financing through government channels to replace 
parallel projects, as in Uganda, and may learn from the infrastructure sectors in doing 
so.  
 
4. Some aspects of system alignment such as PFM and procurement cut across 
sectors. A cross-sectoral solution to these issues is potentially more fruitful than 
narrow sector engagement. 
Our case studies show that sectors are all determined by wider political-economic 
structures with implications for some aspects of systems alignment. This is 
particularly so for financial management and procurement systems, which lie outside 
the sector at national level but influence the effectiveness of aid delivery at a sector 
level in all three countries. To address such underlying issues and barriers, 
engagement at a higher level than the sector may be more effective than trying to find 
solutions within a sector. For example, the Protection of Basic Services Fund in 
Ethiopia or the Poverty Action Fund in Uganda cut across sectors and are less 
disruptive for intra-governmental relations in the recipient country than sector-
specific solutions. Although the PBS fund in Ethiopia is predominantly used for 
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salaries, and does not touch on issues of procurement, expanding this funding 
mechanism to include a cross-sector Local Investment Grant is currently under 
discussion.  
 
5. Paucity of data for measuring progress against the PP for AE at sector level 
Finally, this study has revealed that, at sector level, data to measure progress towards 
the PP for AE remains extremely weak. The indicators developed and used for the 
OECD survey on AE are not differentiated by sector and the availability of 
information with relevance to the PPs varies between sectors and countries. For 
example the Ethiopian health sector had calculated the extent to which development 
partner funding reflected the priorities set by the sector. This information was, 
however, not readily available for the other two sectors.  
Furthermore, the indicators currently identified under the PD are at times not very 
informative unless further background information is obtained. For instance, if 
comparing donor performance against the PD, a percentage of coordinated missions 
or coordinated analytical work does not give much information about how the quality 
of the relationship has improved and whether transaction costs have been reduced for 
the recipient partner government. Last but not least, there is currently no evidence that 
the fulfilment of the PP leads to better development outcomes, e.g. increased access to 
WSS. This is a critical lacunae and should be addressed urgently at the upcoming 
high-level forum in Accra. 
 
Develop a coherent set of sector level indicators to enable monitoring progress 
against the PP. If sector actors are serious in their intention to measure progress 
against the PP at a sector level, they need to develop a set of indicators and data 
against those to enable them to measure and compare progress between sectors and/or 
countries. Ideally this would be underpinned by a more sophisticated measuring of 
progress at country level that links progress against the PP with changes in 
development outputs and outcomes.  
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Annex 1: Summary of Progress against the Paris Principles by Country and Sector 
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Ownership:  Weak The Sector Development Plan is a 
comprehensive sector document but is seen as largely a 
‘donor-driven’ document with limited ownership. The 
Public Expenditure Review for water explicitly notes the 
lack of engagement of sector stakeholders including 
government. The exception may be rural sanitation where 
government has a strongly articulated policy.    
Alignment:  Very weak  
Policy: The LCG provides a forum for information 
exchange but does not generate joint commitments to 
policy or programming. Some joint government-donor 
dialogue takes place on policy (rural sanitation, urban 
water). Joint sector analysis is led by donors not 
government. The Sector Development Plan is largely for 
rural water and does not enjoy wide ownership. 
 
Systems: Country systems are generally reported to be 
unreliable by donors. There is little evidence that any 
donor funds in the sector are on-budget although most 
are reported in the Annual Development Plan. Water and 
sanitation are not included in efforts to improve PFM, 
MTEF and budgeting apart from small TA from WSP and 
DFID to build capacity in parts of the ministry. The low 
level of confidence in national systems was demonstrated 
by DFID who invested in designing a Sector Budget 
Support program which would address some systematic 
corruption and governance issues in selected sectors, 
including rural water and urban water and sanitation, 
though this program was ultimately cancelled. PIUs do 
not appear to be reduced in number. No information on 
procurement systems. 
Harmonisation:  Weak to moderate.  Aid is projectised 
not programmatic. Some harmonisation in urban water 
where donors signed a joint policy and funding framework 
with government (but this is in early days as of now). Also 
some agreement between donors on rural sanitation.  
Strong disagreement on rural water (cf. the PER states 
“Certain strategic choices embodied in the Sector 
Development Programme are at best controversial, at 
worst wrong”). Non-formal (NGO) providers play a very 
significant role but their expenditures are not tracked by 
the PER and other sector documents.   
Managing for Results:  Very weak . Mutually agreed 
monitoring systems are absent – reporting is mostly on a 
project basis to individual donors. 
Mutual Accountability:   Very weak  Some small steps 
towards multi-year funding commitments in urban water 
but no evidence that mutual assessments are planned. 
Ownership:  Weak  There is ‘no formalized health policy’ 
rather a series of five-year development plans which are 
said to be largely donor driven. The SWAp is known as the 
Five-year Health, Nutrition and Population Sector Program 
(HNPSP). This is said to have been ‘rushed’ and the 
process was ‘dominated by consultants’. Some donors 
currently active in the HNPSP confirm a lack of 
government ownership. Some government respondents 
report that the donors already know what they want when 
the dialogue starts.   
Alignment:  Weak to moderate 
Policy:  Several observers noted that there are strong 
policy disagreements between donors and government – 
evidence that donors disagree with the real thrust of 
national policy and have shaped the HNPSP to suit their 
own agenda.  Also some major donors have maintained 
projects outside of HNPSP (ie HIV/AIDs) because of 
disagreements over policy. A significant % of activities are 
not included under the HNPSP (including all health 
expenditures in the urban and for-profit sector, the latter 
accounts for 60% of rural health budget).   
Systems:  Half of donor finance to HNPSP (representing 
about 19% of the total HNPSP budget) goes through a 
pooled fund and uses government PFM systems.  A 
comparable amount of donor funding goes to parallel 
projects using off budget financing arrangements and 
channeled through separate accounts. The remaining 66% 
of the budget comes from government. Budget 
preparation, forecasting and reporting have improved but 
remain rather weak in the view of the Annual Performance 
Review of the HNPSP. Procurements systems have been 
streamlined to ‘fit’ with IDA procurement.  
Harmonisation:  Weak to moderate Some efforts with 
limited results due to mistrust between donors and a 
history of mistrust between some donors and government. 
HNPSP joint supervision has had some success (although 
missions may comprise up to 70 staff). Continuation of 
parallel projects means that transaction costs remain high 
(many donor missions and PIUs).   
Managing for results:  Weak – structures in place for 
HNPSP allow for joint measurement of outcomes and 
good analysis but this is not used by government. The 
Health Information System cannot generate information on 
many indicators included in the HNPSP framework.  
Mutual Accountability: Moderate in HNPSP but said by 
some to be deteriorating. There appears to be increasing 
disillusionment or lack of faith between government and 
donors.    
Ownership:  Weak to moderate the sub-sector 
SWAP (PEDPII) is ‘dominated’ by a single lead 
donor who tends to ‘speak for the government’ (as 
related by other development partners).  The 
SWAp is seen as a system which is ‘parallel’ to 
the national strategy rather than part of it. Donors 
also support a major NGO (BRAC) for non-formal 
education which falls outside the government 
system entirely.  
Alignment:  Weak to moderate 
Policy: Only for formal primary education around 
PEDP II. Non-formal providers and major donors 
in other sub sectors are not aligned with 
government policy.  
Systems:  Pooled fund for most PEDPII donors, 
but major donors also have parallel projects (ie 
IDA funds major programme to reach out of 
school children). PEDPII itself has two parallel 
mechanisms; the Programme Liaison Unit (PLU) 
to assist with monitoring and coordination and the 
Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) inside 
government but staffed by consultants that 
‘carries out implementation’.  PEDPII uses 
‘multiple bank accounts’.   
Harmonization:  Weak to  moderate. LCG and 
PLU are weak and fail to provide a clear direction 
around which donor and non-formal providers can 
harmonise. Joint supervision is carried out but 
mistrust between donors ‘limits its effectiveness’.  
Five donors fund a separate program through 
BRAC (an NGO) with its own pooled fund and 
joint donor missions.  
Managing for results: Very weak –  little 
information available on quality or outcomes. 
Mutual Accountability: Very weak - only within 
PEDPII if at all.  
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Ownership: moderate to strong: the Universal Access 
Plan for water and sanitation has more ambitious targets 
than the Ethiopian PRSP but refers to it; the sector plan is 
not linked to a performance monitoring system and the 
strategy for implementation is not thoroughly developed.  
Alignment: weak to moderate- 
Policy: TC programmes implemented through separate 
Project Implementation Manuals but are currently 
reworked into a sector-wide manual.   
Systems:  in February 2007, approximately 47% of 
external funding was recorded on-budget in addition to 
the Protecting Basic Services Fund28 but the proportion 
has increased since. An off-budget pooled fund for 
capacity building is in place. Financial reporting and 
procurement for capital investments follows on donor 
procedures; this led to significant under-utilisation of 
sector funding (only 26% for some regions) ; in essence, 
the sector is still projectised, The number of parallel PIUs 
was reduced over the last year with WB, AfDB, UNICEF 
and DFID (in silent partnership through WB) combined 
under one PIU; donor funding is provided in multi-year 
frameworks but not necessarily tied to the Ethiopian 
Fiscal Year; more problematic than timely disbursement 
is the lack of government to use funding because of lack 
of capacity to deal with procurement and financial 
reporting. 
Harmonisation: moderate –donors engage through a 
sector working group around the multi-stakeholder forum 
supported through the EUWI; this process will lead to a 
common sector review schedule twice a year (one 
technical, one issue-based) starting from 2008, common 
sector priority actions and analytical work; in 2007, 
donors carried out a number of joint missions (e.g. DFID 
and UNICEF piggy-backed on the WB Mid-term Review)  
Managing for Results: weak – the sector does not have 
performance-based reporting and the monitoring system 
is generally regarded as unreliable and not 
comprehensive. M&E was made a priority at the latest 
sector review  in December07, joint formats were agreed 
and a sector review of MIS is underway 
Mutual Accountability: moderate – bi-annual joint sector 
reviews will take place starting from 2008. 
Ownership: strong - “assertive” ownership of the health 
sector development programme (HSDPIII) linked to the 
Ethiopian PRSP, clear vision, strategy for implementation 
and performance-based MIS emerging. Sector 
government exercises leadership.  
Alignment: weak to moderate:  
Policy: Vertical programmes lead to budget distortions 
and inhibit effective sector-wide planning and budgeting 
(over 60% of donor funding is earmarked for HIV/AIDs, TB 
and Malaria).  
Systems: no figures obtained as to how much donor 
funding is on-budget in addition to funding channelled 
through the protecting basic services fund. There is an on-
budget pooled fund for international procurement of 
medical supplies and the rest of the funding is channelled 
through vertical programmes off budget; the sector uses 
donor PFM and procurement systems; aid predictability is 
a problem in the sector; e.g. PEPFAR has 12 month 
funding cycles; in total there are no donor commitments 
beyond 2010, which is seen as a problem by the sector  
Harmonisation: weak to moderate –donors engage in a 
sector working group and participate in joint sector review 
mechanism, some donors signed recent commitments 
under the international IHP+ initiative BUT disengagement 
from some important vertical programmes. 
Managing for Results: moderate to  strong: Sector is in 
the process of establishing a performance-based reporting 
system (HMIS); ministry has shown that it can deliver and 
measure results for money spent but problem lies with 
donors who are committed to particular outcomes and 
insist on reporting against them  
Mutual Accountability: moderate: there is a code of 
conduct and at IHP+ some donors and vertical 
programmes committed themselves to increased AE. Yet, 
others continue not to be on board; common sector review 
mechanism is in place.  
Ownership: strong – Clear goals and vision in 
education sector development programme, 
(ESDPIII) which is linked to the Ethiopian PRSP; 
operationalised and accompanied by strong 
financial commitments from the side of the 
government; clear leadership from the sector 
government 
Alignment: moderate to strong –  
Policy: Sector funding is aligned with the policy 
but a few donors continue to work outside the 
SWAp. 
Systems: the support to Protecting Basic 
Services are provided as budget support and 
Education receives the lion’s share of it (38%): in 
addition there is a pooled on-budget fund called 
GEQIP which deals with issues such as quality 
and school grants; GEQIP receives funding from 
the fast track initiative; in addition, there is an off-
budget pooled fund for TA. The sector uses donor 
procurement systems. There was no information 
on the reduction of PIUs; predictability of funding 
was seen as an issue as donors suspended 
budget support in the past (1998/2005).  
Harmonisation: moderate - Common 
understanding among ministry and donors that 
joint review process is the way forward; well 
established joint annual review mechanisms, BUT 
a few important donors do not actively participate; 
No information obtained on joint analytical work 
and decrease of PIUs. 
Managing for Results: moderate to strong: 
Education MIS is robust and trusted. Not clear 
whether it is linked to performance.  
Mutual Accountability: moderate: Joint sector 
review mechanism in place and working.   
                                                 
28 The Protecting Basic Services Fund replaces direct budget support. It is channelled via a block grant to the sub-federal governments and administrations of Ethiopia. 
Although all three sectors receive PBS, the education sector profits most from it because the fund is predominantly used for recurrent costs such as salaries.  
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Ownership:  strong – Government has driven the 
development of the SWAp and sector plans, there is a 
sector-wide investment plan (composed of subsector 
plans) linked to MTEF and approved by a sector working 
group (SWG) of government, donors and NGOs.  
Alignment:  moderate to strong  
Policy: strong Most donors work through the sector 
working group and most aid is aligned with the sector 
policy and strategic plan.  
Systems: strong in rural WSS, moderate in urban – In 
the rural sector 87% of aid is as sector budget support 
channelled to local governments in the conditional grant 
from MoF, and there are very few projects. In the urban 
sector there are more projects with varying degrees of 
integration – but no fully stand-alone project units. The 
basket fund - Joint Partnership Fund (JPF) - uses its own 
financial systems but the new Joint Water and Sanitation 
Sector Programme Support (JWSSPS) aims to align it 
further and set out an “exit strategy” from the JPF. It also 
aims to reduce urban projects by establishing a 
government financing mechanism for small towns. 
Central procurement procedures are sometimes 
bypassed because they are very slow.  
 
Disbursement of budgeted donor funds is highly 
predictable, at 79% or 97% if off budget project funding to 
the NWSC (parastatal serving cities) is not counted.   
 
Harmonisation:  moderate to strong. There is a small 
number of donors in the sector, engaged in the sector 
working group and coordinated in a DP group. Most 
support at the central level is through the JPF – a basket 
fund with its own harmonised accounting procedures – 
and the JWSSPS aims to bring all aid into the sector 
under the same umbrella programme. Almost all 
analytical work in the sector is agreed and commissioned 
by the SWG. Some donors work in isolation e.g. on area-
based programmes, or place conditions on funds.  
Managing for Results:  moderate to strong  Clear 
monitoring system and a broad-based annual review 
procress with 10 “Golden Indicators” which add focus. 
The reports are high quality and follow-up on resolutions 
is reasonably good. However there are concerns about 
monitoring. The JWSSPS sets out new benchmarks and 
milestones to strengthen monitoring and allow 
performance-based aid.    
Mutual Accountability:  moderate to strong Donors 
share information on planned activities at the SWG. Joint 
sector review includes central and local government, 
donors civil society and private sector.  
Ownership:  moderate to strong Sector strategic plan is in 
place tied to the budgeting process, with an annual sector 
review. Government has taken a strong lead in some 
respects e.g. pushing vertical funds towards greater 
alignment, but donors remain powerful and government 
leadership has declined in recent years. 
Alignment: weak to moderate 
Policy: Vertical funds and projects have a distorting effect, 
producing resource allocation which is not aligned to 
sector priorities but skewed  towards HIV/AIDS. 
Systems: Early on in the SWAP process, the sector 
successfully drove increased systems alignment as donors 
moved towards sector budget support, and the use of 
parallel systems fell. However with the introduction of 
vertical funds, this trend was reversed and by 2006/07 the 
majority of aid was provided as over 120 projects, the 
majority of which were off budget. Whilst significant 
projects and major vertical funds remain, the Government 
has recently had some success in pushing for alignment of 
vertical funds to government disbursement systems, and is 
insisting on integration of projects and rationalising a large 
number of projects into fewer larger projects 
Aid has become more predictable since the SWAp and in 
2006/7 donor funds were 210% above what was budgeted. 
However this figure masks a range of over- and under-
releases from 46% to 1039%. 
Harmonisation:  weak to moderate Donor coordination 
mechanisms are quite active through a DPs group that 
meets monthly in advance of the Health Policy Advisory 
Committee (HPAC) to present a united front. However 
some weaknesses in communication remain and 
coordination with UN agencies is said to be a challenge.  
In addition the sheer number of projects being supported 
means that harmonisation is not being delivered. There 
are also significant NGOs operating outside the SWAp.  
Managing for results:  moderate Monitoring is said to 
have improved under the SWAp and a joint sector review 
produces a high quality report and undertakings every 
year. However both government decision making and 
donor funding is not well aligned to the achievement of 
sector results. 
Mutual Accountability: moderate Donors are required to 
submit information on their plans to government, which 
shares this information with members of HPAC. The 
annual sector review includes central and local 
government, donors and civil society.  
 
Ownership: strong A sector strategic plan and 
MTEF are in place with a bi-annual joint sector 
review process. The Education Sector 
Consultative Committee (ESCC) includes govt, 
donors and NGOs. It approves plans and advises 
on policy/strategy. Political ownership of the 
agenda is strong and extends to the President, for 
example in the current drive for Universal 
Secondary Education. However the sector lacks a 
strong base of ownership among civil society.  
Alignment: strong  
Policy: Whilst sector funding is well aligned with 
policy, not all donors work through sector 
coordination processes, so their support is not 
always sequenced and prioritised according to the 
sector plan. TA is not well aligned with 
government needs. 
Systems: Since the introduction of a SWAp the 
number of projects has greatly decreased and the 
majority of aid to the sector now comes in the 
form of general and sector budget support – more 
than in the water or health sectors (70% of on-
budget support is EBS). However the number of 
projects is now creeping up. Most projects 
disburse via government systems, but have 
parallel reporting procedures and separate 
missions.  
Harmonisation:  moderate There is a DPs group 
- Education Funding Agencies Group (EFAG) - 
but not all donors work through it. Coordination 
could be improved and the “politics of visibilty” are 
still be in play among donors.  
Managing for results: moderate The SWAp has 
strengthened capacity for planning, 
implementation and monitoring. A sector review 
process is in place but follow-up of concerns in 
the sector seems to be weak. There are concerns 
about the quality of education. 
Mutual Accountability: moderate. Biannual 
sector review includes govt, donors and NGOs. 
Some information on donor activities is shared at 
the ESCC but not all DPs take part. There is a 
perception that donors cannot make up their 
minds whether or not to work fully with 
government.  
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